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Abstract
Recent Supreme Court decisions confirm for the first time in over six 
decades that federal regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause truly is 
limited.  These decisions coincide with an increasing appreciation among scholars 
and jurists for the concept of competitive federalism.  This paper derives the 
implications of competitive federalism for the evolution of federal jurisdiction 
over trade restraints under the Sherman Antitrust Act (1890).  It provides a clear 
and substantively reasoned jurisdictional test based on the analysis of geographic 
market power familiar to antitrust scholars, practitioners, and regulators in 
evaluating horizontal mergers.  To be subject to federal antitrust jurisdiction under 
this test, Sherman Act defendants must control a sufficiently large share of the 
geographic antitrust market that their trade restraint could plausibly affect prices
“in more states than one.”  This test resolves a number of troubling 
inconsistencies in the case law on federal antitrust jurisdiction and provides a 
useful roadmap for how the Court can constructively realign its approach to 
general Commerce Clause jurisdiction. As the Court’s economic understanding
of the market failure underlying a regulatory statute advances, general Commerce 
Clause jurisdiction should evolve to require a closer substantive nexus between 
the market failure and the effect on interstate commerce necessary to justify
federal jurisdiction  This approach will allow the Court to iterate toward an 
appropriate and workable balance of dual sovereignty that takes seriously the 
concept of competitive federalism without requiring a dramatic departure from 
existing constitutional precedent.
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“Choose your rut carefully; you’ll be in it for a long time.”1
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and jurists increasingly acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law on 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction desperately needs a new direction.  Even Lawrence Tribe, widely 
regarded as a liberal commentator, concedes that until very recently the Court’s decisions in this 
area came dangerously close to foreclosing it from imposing any kind of principled 
constitutional limitation on the scope of Commerce Clause jurisdiction.2  And Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has openly admitted that much of the case law is less than a model of clarity.3  In what 
has been heralded by some as the Rehnquist Court’s “celebrated project to restore federalism,”4
and by others less prosaically as “the new federalism,”5 recent Supreme Court cases have 
imposed Tenth Amendment constraints on federal commerce power,6 limited the local 
application of federal regulatory statutes to Congress’s unmistakable intent,7 and most 
importantly found that local non-economic activities lie outside the constitutional scope of 
Commerce Clause jurisdiction.8  Yet, in spite of indications the Rehnquist Court is inclined to
seek a new direction, it remains to be seen how it might do so in a way that minimizes 
troublesome conflicts with the existing body of constitutional precedent.  This essay shows that 
the Court can look to the evolution of Sherman Act (1890) jurisdiction to realign its approach to 
1
 South Dakota farm-road sign.
2
 Lawrence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816 (2000).
3
 U.S. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
4
 Michael Greve, Collision Court, Legal Times, June 12, 2000.
5
 See, generally, Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause and 
the Proposed New Abdication, 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 869 (2000).
6 E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
7 E.g., Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook 
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
8
 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4Commerce Clause jurisdiction to restore the balance of dual sovereignty while posing little 
immediate threat to constitutional precedent.
The first of two steps is for the Court to fully embrace competitive federalism as the long-
run framework within which to gradually narrow the evolving contours of Commerce Clause
jurisdiction.9 Competitive federalism has experienced growing appreciation among political 
scientists, economists, and constitutional scholars,10 with some even suggesting it has been the 
driving force of sustained economic development in modern times.11 There is no doubt the U.S. 
Constitution establishes a federal system, but this says nothing about what determines the proper 
balance of dual sovereignty.  Under competitive federalism, state and federal governments 
compete with one another to provide regulation to a mobile citizenry. State regulation under 
local “police powers” is justified when economic markets fail to allocate resources efficiently 
due to economic spillovers — so-called “externalities” — that separate the parties who benefit 
from those who bear costs of an activity.  When confined to a single state, competition from 
other states ensures that state’s regulators have sufficient incentive to address economic 
spillovers .  In the face of interstate spillovers, however, individual states will misallocate 
political resources by engaging in too little regulation of their internal economic markets.  
9
 Competitive federalism is also variously known as “the economic of federalism,” see Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust 
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 23 (1983), and “market-preserving” federalism, see
Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:  Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
10
 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure theory of Local Expenditures, 60 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); James M. Buchanan & 
Charles J. Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility:  An Assessment of the Tiebout Model, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 25 
(1972); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); 
William A. Fischel, Fiscal and Environmental Considerations in the Location of Firms in Suburban Communities, 
in Fiscal Zoning and Land Use Controls (Edwin S. Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975); Ralph K. Winter, State 
Law, Shareholder Protections, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977); Carol M. Rose, 
Planning and Dealing:  Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837 (1983); 
Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 23 (1983); Roberta 
Romano, Law as a Product:  Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG.  225 (1985); Roberta 
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987); Wallace E. Oates & 
Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:  Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 
J. PUB. ECON.  333 (1988); Thomas R. Dye, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:  COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS
(1990); Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid, COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:  
EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1991);  Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate 
Competition:  Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 1210 (1992); Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:  Market-Preserving Federalism 
and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995); Roberta Romano, State Competition for Corporate 
Charters, in THE NEW FEDERALISM:  CAN STATES BE TRUSTED? (John Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds. 1997), at 
129; Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause and the 
Proposed New Abdication, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 869 (2000).  
11
 Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:  Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
5Federal regulation of economic markets under the Commerce Clause is justified only when 
competition between states leads to a political market failure.
This approach has been criticized as a prescription for how the Court should determine 
the limits of federal commerce power because those seeking regulation can always make a 
plausible claim that the activity in question generates an interstate economic spillover, while in 
fact they are motivated by private rent seeking.12 Throughout this essay we remain agnostic on 
this issue.  Whether a federal regulation is driven by public interest or rent seeking, our sole 
concern is with how the Court can gradually identify and screen out applications of the 
regulation that do not plausibly involve interstate economic spillovers.  The Court can thereby 
iterate toward the proper balance of dual sovereignty, and political competition should 
increasingly limit the sum of economic rents the respective sovereigns are able to extract.13
Competitive federalism has clear implications for the evolution of Sherman Act
jurisdiction, and this evolution provides a useful roadmap to help the Court can find the 
appropriate jurisdictional balance for its general Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It is both 
fitting and instructive that case law under one of the nation’s first pieces of Commerce Clause 
legislation would provide such a roadmap,14 for this is where judicial understanding of the 
relevant market failure can be expected to have evolved furthest to reduce legal uncertainty
raised by the statutory shock.  Passed in response to fears that the great trusts were beyond the 
power of any state to effectively regulate owing to a political market failure,15 the Sherman Act 
prohibits only restraints of trade or commerce “among the several states.”16 For more than 80 
years following passage of the Act, the Court struggled with legal uncertainty to identify the 
nature of the market failure resulting from various business practices alleged to restrain trade.  
12 Nelson Lund, Historical Perspective: Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1045 (1997) (The Court 
should abandon “the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine, as well as substantive due process and some of 
the wilder extensions of equal protection analysis” and can plausibly do so within the bounds of the drafters’ intent 
and established constitutional precedent.).
13
 For one among thousands of scholarly works on rent seeking, see Fred McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent 
Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).  We discuss the issue of rent 
seeking more fully infra, at ?.
14
 The first piece of federal Commerce Clause regulation was the Interstate Commerce Act (1887).
15 E.g., Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 658, 658-60, 689-91 (1993) and nn. 9 & 147; and Easterbrook, at 41 n. 40.
16
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, reads as follows:  “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is hereby 
declared to be illegal . . .”  Section 2 of the Act reads as follows:  “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . .”.
6This led to a patchwork of conflicting decisions, judicial confusion over the proper objective of 
the Act, and condemnation of business activities now widely recognized as pro-competitive.  As 
economic theory progressed it gave the Court increasing insight into the nature and effect of 
various trade restraints.  Driven largely by the Chicago School of economics,17 antitrust scholars 
began to develop and test hypotheses regarding a host of business practices that were argued to 
restrain trade.18  This process eventually generated a body of scientific knowledge sufficiently 
reliable to support expert testimony on the nature of the market failure associated with trade 
restraints,19 now widely regarded as the defendants’ exercise of market power.  The problem 
with market power is not that it allows firms to suppress competition or earn monopoly profits, 
but that it may lead them to misallocate resources by reducing output and raising prices to 
consumers.  Courts and commentators now largely agree the exclusive substantive objective of 
the Sherman Act is to promote consumer welfare.20
Case law under the Sherman Act has since evolved toward a body of clear, workable 
substantive rules, but relying uncritically on the substantial effects test from its decisions on 
general Commerce Clause jurisdiction the Court has routinely upheld applications of the 
Sherman Act to restraints that harm consumers only locally, if at all. The Court’s most recent 
jurisdictional decision under the Act indicates it has yet to recognize the consumer welfare 
standard’s profound jurisdictional implications. In Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas (1991) a 
narrow majority of the Court found an alleged conspiracy by a chain of hospitals to exclude a 
single doctor from the Los Angeles market for eye surgery had a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce to support jurisdiction under the Act.  But-for the defendants’ aggregated commercial 
activities, the Court reasoned, interstate commerce would surely have suffered a substantial 
17
 Some have criticized the Chicago School as ideologically motivated.  Whether true or not, this criticism is largely 
irrelevant because the Chicago School focused on scientific hypothesis testing.  The spirit of this approach can be 
found in Milton Friedman’s pioneering essay The Methodology of Positive Economics (in Essays in Positive 
Economics 3 (1953)).  
18
 This literature is too large to reference in full.  Perhaps the first contributor was John McGee, who suggested in an 
early article that predatory pricing is irrational and that according to the trial record of U.S. v. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. 
1, 69 (1911), the Standard Oil Company never actually used it.  John McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The 
Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. & ECON. 137 (1958);
19
 D. Bruce Johnsen, Daubert, The Scientific Method, and Economic Expert Testimony, 9 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LAW 
& PUBLIC POLICY 149 (1999) (addressing the admissibility of economic expert testimony under Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).  
20 See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) and Robert H. Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 55 
(1978).  
7effect.21 Joined in dissent by three members of the Court, Justice Scalia noted that the majority’s 
“analysis tells us nothing about the substantiality of the impact on interstate commerce generated 
by the particular conduct at issue here.”22 He went on to argue that the Sherman Act “does not . . 
. prohibit all conspiracies that have sufficient constitutional ‘nexus’ to interstate commerce to be 
regulated.  It prohibits only those conspiracies that are ‘in restraint of trade or commerce among 
the several States.’  This language commands a judicial inquiry into the nature and potential 
effect of each particular restraint.”23
Following Summit, federal courts have regularly entertained cases in which the interstate 
exercise of market power is so unlikely that the defendants’ restraint should be presumed as a 
matter of law to be purely intrastate.24 In the spirit of Justice Scalia’s dissent, the second step the 
Court should take to realign its approach to Commerce Clause jurisdiction is to overturn Summit
by formally recognizing the jurisdictional implications of the consumer welfare standard.  If the 
market failure justifying federal regulation of trade restraints is the exercise of market power, 
and if the problem with market power is that it injures consumers by raising prices, then 
according to competitive federalism trade restraints that do not plausibly increase prices to 
consumers outside the home state should lie beyond federal reach.
Summit’s expansive test for federal antitrust jurisdiction stands in contrast to the Court’s 
more recent decisions addressing general Commerce Clause jurisdiction, which, though 
themselves supported by only narrow majorities, reflect the Court’s growing appreciation for 
competitive federalism.  In U.S. v. Alfonso Lopez (1995),28 for example, the Court struck down 
the federal Gun Free School Zones Act (1990) as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction because the criminal activity it addressed was neither commercial nor economic in 
nature and therefore could not possibly have had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  In 
21
 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
22
 Summit, 336.
23
 Summit, 334, 338.
24
 Perhaps in an effort to highlight the absurdity of the majority’s holding in Summit, Judge Posner of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted in reviewing a post-Summit challenge to Sherman Act 
jurisdiction that if two children operating competing lemonade stands agreed to fix prices there is no clear principle 
preventing them from being subject to the jurisdiction of the Act, even though “the effect on the national economy 
would be slight.”  Hammes v. AAMCO, 33 F.3d 774, 780-81 (1994).
25
 D. Bruce Johnsen and Moin A. Yahya, A Geographic Market Power Test For Sherman Act Jurisdiction 
(forthcoming, American Enterprise Institute).
26
 This was Justice Marshall’s interpretation of “among” the several states in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
27 1991 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the United States Justice Department Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, § 1.1 (Sep. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
8U.S. v. Antonio J. Morrison (2000) the Court more recently struck down the civil remedy 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (1994), again because the criminal activity it 
addressed was neither commercial nor economic in nature.  To find otherwise, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted in both majority opinions, would convert the Commerce Clause into a general 
police power constitutionally reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment. The Court’s
obvious appreciation for competitive federalism in Lopez and Morrison suggests that it may be 
inclined to continue in this direction in future cases.
The remainder of this essay builds the normative case in favor of competitive federalism 
and shows how its implications for Sherman Act jurisdiction can be used to guide the evolution 
of general Commerce Clause jurisdiction.  Section I reviews the relevant case law.  It begins with 
a brief look at a selection of noted cases on general Commerce Clause jurisdiction and then turns 
specifically to the case law on Sherman Act jurisdiction.  Our intent in reviewing this body of 
law is merely to lay a foundation to show that the geographic market power test is broadly 
consistent with Commerce Clause case law as it has evolved over the past 180 years.
Section II describes the simple economics of market power and illustrates the practical 
approach antitrust regulators have developed under the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines to 
define the relevant product and geographic markets.  This approach identifies the geographic 
antitrust market to assess the likely effect of horizontal mergers on market power and consumer 
welfare, but we show it can easily be adapted to assess the interstate effects of any category of 
trade restraints.
Section III describes what we characterize as the geographic market power test for 
Sherman Act jurisdiction.29 According to this test, to establish federal jurisdiction under the Act 
the complainant must allege, and ultimately prove, that the defendant has a sufficiently large 
share of the geographic antitrust market that it can plausibly exercise market power “in more 
states than one.”30  Although straight forward, this jurisdictional test is novel, substantively 
reasoned, and completely consistent with the methodology antitrust regulators use under the 
Merger Guidelines to evaluate the substantive merits of horizontal mergers.31 The geographic 
28
 514 U.S. 549.
29
 D. Bruce Johnsen and Moin A. Yahya, A Geographic Market Power Test For Sherman Act Jurisdiction 
(forthcoming, American Enterprise Institute).
30
 This was Justice Marshall’s interpretation of “among” the several states in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
31 1991 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the United States Justice Department Antitrust Division and the 
Federal Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, § 1.1 (Sep. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
9market power test resolves a number of troubling inconsistencies in the Court’s case law on 
federal antitrust jurisdiction.
Section IV demonstrates the analytical force of the geographic market power test.  We 
show that it is consistent with the statutory intent behind the Sherman Act, and that within the 
framework of competitive federalism it is the only economically sensible approach to setting 
appropriate limits on federal antitrust jurisdiction.  What is more, the geographic market power 
test will resolve the current turmoil over Sherman Act jurisdiction in the federal circuits and 
hasten the rate at which the Court’s understanding of novel business practices evolves.
Section V concludes by sketching a model of how case law evolves in response to the 
judicial uncertainty created by statutory shocks.  We show that the geographic market power test 
is a compelling step in the evolution of Sherman Act jurisdiction and that it provides the Court 
with a useful roadmap to realign its approach to general Commerce Clause jurisdiction. The 
legal uncertainty that attends most regulatory statutes prevents the Court from acting too quickly, 
but as the Court gradually accumulates  the stock of knowledge necessary to identify the 
geographic scope of the underlying market failure, it can and should require an increasingly clear 
nexus between the proscribed conduct and an interstate spillover.   This will allow the Court to 
achieve a balance of dual sovereignty consistent with competitive federalism while posing little 
immediate threat to constitutional precedent. 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISDICTION
“. . . admittedly, our case law [on ‘substantial effects’] has not been clear.”32
Every first-year law student learns that the federal government derives its sovereign 
authority from a limited set of powers enumerated in the constitution.  Although the Supremacy 
Clause ensures that these powers are plenary,33 and the Necessary and Proper Clause ensures that 
they include the power to do whatever is necessary to effectuate them,34 any power not 
specifically conferred on the federal government by the constitution is expressly reserved to the 
32
 Lopez, 559 (Rehnquist, C.J).
33
 U.S. Constitution, Article VI.
34
 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
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sovereign states, or to the people, by the Tenth Amendment.35 These residual powers include the 
states’ local “police powers.”  Various enumerated federal powers have proven to be elastic, but 
perhaps none more so than the Commerce Clause, whose jurisprudence prescribes the delicate 
balance of dual sovereignty characteristic of our federal system.  This section briefly reviews the 
Supreme Court’s case law on federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction in four parts.
Part A examines the early era, beginning with Justice Marshall’s famous opinion in 
Gibbons v. Ogden (1824).36  The ensuing case law during this era focused largely on the 
resolution of conflicts between state laws that discriminated against interstate commerce and 
unexercised federal commerce power — the so-called “negative,” or “dormant,” Commerce 
Clause.  By the end of the era it tended toward a narrow and formalistic reading of the 
Commerce Clause.  Part B examines the transitional era beginning with passage of the Sherman 
Act, marking the rise of the affirmative Commerce Clause.  During this time the Court gradually 
broadened federal authority over interstate commerce, ultimately rejecting, distinguishing, or 
simply ignoring many of its early decisions.37  The transitional era witnessed a stunning increase 
in the number of federal statutes and culminated in the wake of the New Deal with the Court’s 
famous decision in Wickard v. Filburn (1942).38 Wickard dramatically broadened federal 
commerce power by extending it to purely local activity that, when aggregated horizontally 
across all those covered by the regulation, exerts a “substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce.”39 Part C examines the modern era, focusing largely on federal antitrust jurisdiction 
under Wickard’s aggregated substantial effects test up through the Court’s decision in Summit.40
This era has been marked by a virtual proliferation of federal statutes tied to the Commerce 
Clause, many of them having little to do with obviously commercial activity.  In upholding these 
statues, the Court continued to expand general federal commerce power under the aggregated 
substantial effects test, leading to realistic concerns that federal authority had completely 
swallowed the local police powers of the several states.41 Part D examines the Court’s case law 
35
 The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
36
 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
37
 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 
4.6, 4.7, 4.8 (1999).
38
 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
39
 Wickard, 125.
40
 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
41 E.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CINN. L. REV. 199, 259 
(1971); Lawrence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816; Ronald D. Rotunda, The New States’ Rights, the 
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following Summit, which appears to embrace the framework of competitive federalism and may 
signal a post-modern era destined to impose real constraints on federal Commerce Clause 
jurisdiction.
A.  The Early Era
In Gibbons v. Ogden the Court struck down a New York law granting a monopoly to 
Robert Fulton over the transport of passengers by steamboat between New Jersey and New York 
because it directly conflicted with a federal statute regulating the “coasting trade.”  In prescribing 
the limits of federal authority over interstate commerce, Marshall found that “[c]ommerce among 
the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the 
interior.”42  He went on to elaborate in the following famous passage, which the Court has 
interpreted at various times to support both narrow and broad federal commerce powers:  
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be restricted 
to that commerce which concerns more States than one. . . .  The enumeration 
presupposes something not enumerated; and that something . . . must be the 
exclusively internal commerce of a State[, which does] not affect other States, 
and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some 
of the general powers of the government.43
This statement draws an illusive distinction between state authority over completely 
internal commerce — which is reserved to the states — and federal authority over internal 
commerce that affects other states — which is the proper subject of federal regulation.  In 
practice, the distinction has proven difficult to apply with any kind of precision because Marshall
declined to provide a functional blueprint for identifying the nature of the “effects” necessary to 
resolve the balance of dual sovereignty.  As we show later, the simple economics of market 
power provides such a blueprint in the field of antitrust that might usefully be generalized to 
other fields. 
New Federalism, the New Commerce Clause and the Proposed New Abdication, 25 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 869 
(2000), n. 157.
42
 Gibbons,194.
43 Gibbons, 194-95.   
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In Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851), the petitioner challenged an 1803 Pennsylvania 
statute requiring vessels sailing in or out of the port of Philadelphia to employ a local pilot to 
navigate the Delaware River. 44  After Cooley refused the services of a pilot for his vessels, the 
Philadelphia Board of Wardens assessed him one-half the normal pilotage fee required by the 
statute.  Being licensed under the federal statute to carry on the coasting trade, Cooley demurred, 
claiming the Pennsylvania statute was invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause.  According 
to Justice Curtis, whether unexercised federal commerce power over a particular subject is 
exclusive depends crucially on the nature of the subject.  “[T]he power to regulate commerce
embraces a vast field, containing . . . exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; 
some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule . . . and some, like the subject now in 
question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of 
navigation.”45  In his view, “the nature of [pilotage] is such as to leave no doubt of the superior 
fitness and propriety, not to say the absolute necessity, of different systems of regulation, drawn 
from local knowledge and experience, and conformed to local wants.”46 Justice Curtis thus made 
an early assertion of competitive federalism as the proper framework for identifying the nature of 
the effects necessary to resolve the balance of dual sovereignty.
The ensuing case law, much of it addressing dormant commerce powers, led the Court to 
a narrower and more formalistic view of federal commerce jurisdiction, while at the same time 
developing the concept of exclusive “state police powers” under the Tenth Amendment.47  The 
Court’s increasing formalism gradually gave weight to the now discarded notion —
characterized as “dual federalism” — that state and federal powers repose in separate geographic 
“spheres of sovereignty.”48 Most notably, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Illinois
(1886),49 the Court found that a state statute prohibiting discrimination in railroad rates “for any 
distance within the State” would not have conflicted with the federal commerce power if its 
application had been confined to shipments occurring completely within the state.  The Court 
44
 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
45
 Cooley, 319.
46
 Cooley, 319.
47
 Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 15 (1950).
48
 Gavil, n. 90, and Bruce Little, Note:  A Case of Judicial Backsliding:  Artificial Restraints on the Commerce 
Power Reach of the Sherman Act, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, n. 20 and surrounding text (interstate commerce seen to 
involve the flow of goods across state lines).
49
 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
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struck down the statute in the case at hand, however, because it prohibited discrimination against 
shipments originating in Illinois but bound for other states.  
Perhaps the Court’s most formalistic statement of dual sovereignty came in Kidd v. 
Pearson (1888).50  In upholding a state statute allowing the importation and sale of intoxicating 
liquors within the state but prohibiting in-state manufacture, even for export, the Court stated that 
“[i]f it be held that [commerce] includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended 
to be the subject of commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would 
[include] every branch of human industry. . . .  It would follow as an inevitable result that the 
duty would devolve on Congress to regulate all of these delicate, multiform, and vital interests 
— interests which in their nature are and must be, local in all the details of their successful 
management.”51  Such a scheme, the Court insisted, would be impracticable.
B.  The Transitional Era
U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. (1895) was the first case to address the extent of federal antitrust 
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause,52 and it proved to be a false start.  The restraint in 
question was a proposed horizontal combination between five sugar manufacturers that would 
have allowed its largest member, the American Sugar Refining Company, to control roughly 
98% of domestic sugar refining capacity.  Relying heavily on Kidd’s statement of dual 
federalism, the Court conceded that the combination would establish a “monopoly in 
manufacture,” but found that it was nonetheless beyond the federal power to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause.  In the Court’s reasoning, “the power to control the manufacture of a given 
thing involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition . . . and although the exercise of 
that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce into play, it does not control it, and 
affects it only incidentally and indirectly.  Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part 
of it.”53
50
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E.C. Knight’s formalistic approach began to unravel only six years later in Swift & Co. v. 
U.S. (1905),54 where the Court struck down a collusive agreement between the dealers of sixty 
percent of the fresh meat in the country.  Although their agreement to reduce the prices at which 
they bought livestock and raise the prices at which they sold fresh meat at wholesale applied to 
transactions strictly within single states, the Court had little trouble finding the agreement well 
within the reach of federal commerce power.  Justice Holmes summarily dismissed E.C. Knight’s
formalistic view of federal commerce power in favor of a more functional approach, concluding 
that “commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn 
from the course of business.”55  The Court lay to res t any doubt about the status of E.C. Knight in 
its landmark decision in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S. (1911), where it expressly 
rejected as “unsound” the formalistic distinction between commerce and manufacture.56  Its case 
law thereafter began to embrace the more functional approach Holmes shaped in Swift.
In the Shreveport Rate Cases (1914),57 the Court upheld an Interstate Commerce 
Commission order aimed at preventing discriminatory railroad rates by equalizing rates between 
Louisiana and Texas with those between equally-distant points entirely within the state of Texas.  
Undermining its earlier decision in Wabash, the Court found that the economic effects of purely 
intrastate activities of various rail carriers were so closely and substantially related to their 
interstate activities that Congress has the power to “prevent the common instrumentalities of 
interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being used in their intrastate operations to 
the injury of interstate commerce”58 as long as federal control of intrastate rates is “essential or 
appropriate to the security of that traffic [and] the efficiency of the interstate service.”59
Roughly 15 years later, Franklin Roosevelt’s unprecedented New Deal legislation 
ushered in a host of conflicts between state police powers and the affirmative Commerce Clause.  
Initially, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935)60 and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 
(1936),61 the Court retreated to the distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce it 
had relied on in E.C. Knight.  Striking down the wages and hours provisions of the National 
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Industrial Recovery Act (1933), the Court in Schechter found that persons employed in purely 
intrastate activities have only an indirect effect on interstate commerce and therefore fall outside 
the reach of federal commerce power.  Roosevelt’s Court Packing Plan quickly put an end to this 
retreat.62  In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. (1937) the Court addressed a challenge to the 
National Labor Relations Act (1935), which prohibited employers from engaging in various 
“unfair labor practices affecting commerce.”63  Although purporting to preserve the distinction 
between commerce among the several states and commerce completely internal to states,64 Chief 
Justice Hughes abandoned Schechter’s direct-indirect effects distinction.  Instead, he found that 
the reach of the federal commerce power is necessarily a question of degree, extending to 
intrastate activities having “such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions.”65
Five years later, in Wickard v. Filburn (1942),66 the Court cemented NLRB’s “close and 
substantial relation” approach, finally putting to rest the formalistic distinctions it relied on in 
Wabash, Kidd, E.C. Knight, and Schechter and expanding federal commerce power to what may 
be “the outer limits” of the constitutional authority.67  There, the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(1938) imposed a national quota on the “marketing” of wheat, and the Secretary of Agriculture’s 
marketing orders in turn allotted the national quota to individual farms, including Filburn’s.  
When Filburn produced what the Court conceded was a “trivial” amount of wheat in excess of 
his allotment purely for use and consumption on the farm, the Secretary assessed him a 
marketing penalty.68  Filburn claimed the marketing quotas were beyond the reach of federal 
commerce jurisdiction because they applied to strictly local production and consumption whose 
effects on interstate commerce, if any, were merely “indirect.”69 The Court flatly rejected 
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Filburn’s claim.  Noting that that Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons “described the federal 
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded,”70 Justice Jackson found that Congress can 
regulate even local production for farm use that is trivial by itself if, aggregated horizontally 
across many local producers, “it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” by 
displacing market transactions that would otherwise occur.71 We characterize this as the
cumulative or aggregated “substantial effects” test for federal commerce jurisdiction.
C.  The Modern Era
Three years after its expansive decision in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court decided 
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co. (1948),72 specifically relying on 
Wickard’s horizontal aggregation principle to establish Sherman Act jurisdiction over an 
agreement among local sugar beet refiners.  The complaint alleged that the defendant, one of 
three refiners located in northern California, conspired with the other two to revise the standard 
form contract they used to buy beets from nearby growers.  Prior to the revision, growers’ 
receipts from refiners were based on a formula multiplying the number of pounds of beets 
purchased by the percentage of the refiner’s net returns per pound of beets from sugar sales, all 
adjusted by the tested sugar content of the grower’s beets over the period covered by the 
contract.73  The revised contracts specified, instead, that the grower’s receipts were to be 
determined by the average net return of all three refiners combined.
The plaintiffs, a group of growers that had agreed to the revised contract, later brought an 
action under the Sherman Act alleging the defendant’s actions illegally fixed the price of sugar 
70
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beets and thereby restrained interstate commerce in sugar.74  Yet, the District Court judge 
inferred just the opposite from the face of the contracts contained in the complaint, according to 
which the price of sugar in interstate commerce determined the price the defendant paid per 
pound of raw beets.  To expedite an appeal on the question of federal jurisdiction he allowed the 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to eliminate the allegation that the defendant’s restraint 
“affected the price of sugar in interstate commerce,” in essence replacing it with the charge that 
the restraint of trade in beets, by itself, affected interstate commerce.75
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Rutledge found that the three refiners were the 
only practical market for the petitioners’ beets owing to high transport costs and barriers to entry 
by competing refiners.  As a result, the conspirators controlled the quantity of sugar 
manufactured and sold in interstate commerce from northern California.76  In response to the 
defendant’s claim that the three refiners were powerless to affect the national price of sugar, 
Rutledge found “[t]he idea that stabilization of prices paid for the only raw material consumed in 
an industry has no influence toward reducing competition in the distribution of the finished 
product, in an integrated industry such as this, is impossible to accept.”77  Drawing on Wickard’s
horizontal aggregation principle, he reasoned that “Congress’ power to keep the interstate market 
free of goods produced under conditions inimical to the general welfare . . . may be exercised in 
individual cases without showing any specific effect upon interstate commerce . . . .  [I]t is 
enough that the individual activity when multiplied into a general practice . . . contains a threat to 
the interstate economy that requires preventive regulation.”78
In U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society (1952)79 the Court took a more limited approach 
to federal commerce power.  There, the government brought a civil action to enjoin various 
medical associations and doctors that had formed together to provide affordable prepaid medical 
plans to subscribing patients entirely within the state of Oregon.  Because the plans drew 
providing doctors from patients’ local community, and because the doctors associated 
themselves exclusively with either the state or the county medical society’s plan, the government 
claimed the arrangements amounted to territorial allocations in restraint of interstate commerce 
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under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Justice Jackson rejected the government’s claim, 
noting there was no evidence of an attempt by the defendants to withhold medical service and the 
only interstate commerce involved related to a few “sporadic” and “incidental” payments to 
“out-of-state doctors” for patients who happened to be temporarily away from their local service 
areas in Oregon.  This was insufficient to show a restraint of trade in interstate commerce.  
Instead, he reasoned that the government would have had to show interstate commerce was 
adversely affected specifically by the “allocation of territories by doctor-sponsored plans, [but 
as] far as any evidence brought to our attention discloses, the activities of the latter are wholly 
intrastate.”80  In the antitrust setting, Justice Jackson apparently eschewed application of the 
horizontal aggregation principle he had announced in Wickard.  This surely would have allowed 
him to find a substantial effect on interstate commerce if he had chosen to follow Justice 
Rutledge’s use of horizontal aggregation in Mandeville.
In the midst of the Great Society programs of the 1960s, the Court handed down a 
number of decisions dramatically expanding general federal commerce power under the 
substantial effects test while failing to identify any principled limitation on its application.81  The 
most obvious expansion was driven by the compelling social objective in the realm of civil 
rights, where the underlying evil — racial discrimination — had little obvious connection to 
commercial activity.  The expansion is most clearly evident in Katzenbach v. McClung (1964),82
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964),83 and Daniel v. Paul (1969),84 where the 
Court relied on both horizontal and vertical aggregation to show that the defendants’ apparently 
local activities substantially affected interstate commerce.  The Court’s reasoning went 
something like this.  Even if a particular instance of racial discrimination in a local restaurant’s 
food sales does not, by itself, substantially affect interstate commerce, it is sufficient if that 
restaurant’s vertically-related inputs, say, its raw food supplies, are “in commerce.” This is 
because the food supplies of all restaurants engaged in racial discrimination, when aggregated 
horizontally, comprise a substantial portion of interstate commerce.  If such restaurants were 
80
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magically to vanish — that is, but-for their existence — the economic effect on the quantum or 
character of interstate commerce would surely be substantial in some way.  These cases 
explicitly reject any requirement that the party asserting Commerce Clause jurisdiction show a 
nexus between the specific instance of racial discrimination and an effect on interstate 
commerce.
By 1975, the vertical aggregation principle on which the Court relied in the civil rights 
cases began to creep into its decisions on Sherman Act jurisdiction.  In Goldfarb v. Virginia 
(1975),85 the Court considered a challenge to the Fairfax County Bar Association’s (FCBA’s) 
minimum fee schedule.  When the plaintiffs were unable to find an attorney willing to perform 
an examination for their residential real estate closing for a reduced fee, they filed a class action 
suit claiming that the FCBA’s minimum fee schedule violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that as a practical matter title 
examinations are indispensable to the financing of real estate transactions because lenders 
require them as a condition for making a loan.  Since a substantial volume of real estate loans 
originated outside the state, and “given the substantial volume of commerce involved and the 
inseparability of [title examinations] from the interstate aspects of real estate transactions,” he 
concluded that “interstate commerce has been sufficiently affected,”86 regardless of whether the 
fee schedule could be shown to reduce the number of title examinations or increase fees.  Thus, 
according to Burger’s assessment, but-for the availability of all title examinations aggregated 
horizontally the market for a vertically-related input in the stream of commerce — real estate 
financing — would surely suffer a substantial economic effect sufficient to support federal 
jurisdiction.87
In Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees (1976) the Court extended the cumulative 
effects test to a local hospital’s alleged attempt to restrict the supply of hospital beds.88  The 
substance of the petitioners claim was that the Rex Hospital and others conspired to monopolize 
the hospital business in Raleigh, North Carolina, by attempting to prevent the petitioner from 
expanding its hospital facilities in that market.  Although the petitioner’s hospital business was 
84
 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
85
 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
86
 421 U.S. 773, 785 (1975).
87
 Burger went on to note that “there may be legal services that have no nexus with interstate commerce and thus are 
beyond the reach of the Sherman Act,” but he gave no indication how a party might make such a factual showing 
within the parameters set by the remainder of his opinion.  421 U.S. 773, 786 (1975).
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strictly local, it asserted the necessary connection to interstate commerce because a substantial 
portion of its own medicines and supplies, insurance proceeds, management services, and 
construction loans came from outside the state.  The District Court dismissed the petitioner’s 
amended complaint because it failed to allege a sufficient nexus between the claimed violations 
of the Sherman Act and interstate commerce, but in doing so it apparently failed clearly to 
indicate whether it had based its dismissal on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or the 
petitioner’s failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  Sitting en banc, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed, finding that the petitioner’s hospital business was strictly local and that 
since the amended complaint made no claim that the respondents’ actions had or would likely 
have had an effect on any market price, the petitioner failed adequately to allege a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce and thereby failed to state a claim.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts.  Stating that the basis for the District 
Court’s dismissal was irrelevant, Justice Marshall argued that “[i]n either event, the critical 
inquiry is into the adequacy of the nexus between respondents’ conduct and interstate commerce 
that is alleged in the complaint.”89 Marshall went on to find that “[a]n effect can be ‘substantial’ 
under the Sherman Act even if its impact on interstate commerce falls far short of . . . affecting 
market price.”90  He concluded that the petitioners complaint is wholly adequate to state a claim 
in this case because it “fairly [alleges that the] conspiracy, to the extent it is successful, will place 
‘unreasonable burdens on the free and uninterrupted flow’ of interstate commerce.”91
In spite of the Court’s back-door acceptance of horizontal aggregation in Mandeville and 
vertical aggregation in Goldfarb, most circuits continued to require Sherman Act plaintiff’s to 
establish jurisdiction in either of two ways.  The plaintiff could claim that the allegedly unlawful 
conduct itself took place “in commerce” or that the allegedly unlawful conduct had a “substantial 
effect” on interstate commerce, even though it took place intrastate.  In McLain v. Real Estate 
Bd. of New Orleans (1980), however, the Court found Sherman Act jurisdiction where the 
defendants’ broader business activities, aggregated vertically, were in commerce even though the 
allegedly unlawful conduct was not.92
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The plaintiff class of real estate buyers in McLain claimed that real estate brokers in the 
Greater New Orleans area had engaged in a massive conspiracy to fix commission rates, split 
fees, and suppress useful market information.  The only connection between the conspiracy and 
interstate commerce shown by the plaintiffs was that brokers routinely, though gratuitously, 
advised buyers on how to obtain title insurance and financing, often from sources outside 
Louisiana.  The District Court found that the defendants’ brokerage activity occurred entirely in 
Louisiana and that the plaintiffs failed to allege, as required by Goldfarb, that the provision of 
insurance and financing constituted a large volume of interstate commerce inseparable from 
brokerage services.  Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed.93
Chief Justice Burger reversed the lower courts, finding they had misinterpreted Goldfarb.  
That case, he asserted, addressed the “in commerce” test rather than the “substantial effects” test.
To establish that the defendants’ activities were in the stream of commerce, it was necessary to 
show that they were an “integral part of an interstate transaction.”  As in the case at hand, such a 
showing is unnecessary where the alleged basis for federal jurisdiction is the substantial effects 
test, which is “in no way restricted to those challenged activities that have an integral 
relationship to an activity in interstate commerce.”94  As Burger described the substantial effects 
test:
To establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation it would 
be sufficient for petitioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce generated by respondents’ [broader] brokerage activity.  Petitioners 
need not make the more particularized showing of an effect on interstate 
commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those 
other aspects of respondents’ activity that are alleged to be unlawful. . . .  If 
establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had 
an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a 
demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive 
effect.  This is not the rule of our cases.95
Given the uncontroverted testimony from local lenders that an appreciable amount of 
their residential real estate loans occurred in interstate commerce, Burger concluded that “there 
93
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remains only the requirement that respondents’ activities which allegedly have been infected by 
a price-fixing conspiracy be shown ‘as a matter of practical economics’ to have a not 
insubstantial effect on the interstate commerce involved.”96  The infected activities version of the 
substantial effects test apparently requires the plaintiff to allege only that the defendants’ 
unlawful conduct stands to have a “not insubstantial effect” on interstate commerce because, 
being interstate, the defendants’ broader vertically-related business activities — such as title 
insurance and real estate financing — can be presumed to have a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce when aggregated horizontally across all defendants.  That is, but-for the 
defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct the economic effect on the quantum or character of 
interstate commerce would be substantial, and this, according to Burger, was enough to carry the 
plaintiffs’ jurisdictional burden.
Finally, in Summit the Court established its most expansive version of the substantial 
effects test, finding that a Sherman Act defendant’s entire line of business can be infected by an 
economically trivial local restraint.  The plaintiff in that case was a licensed and very skilled eye 
surgeon who refused to hire the services of a physician’s assistant as required by the defendants’ 
hospital policy.  In response, the defendants — including the hospital at which the plaintiff held 
staff privileges, its parent corporation, and several of the plaintiff’s fellow doctors who served on 
the hospital’s peer review board — initiated peer review proceedings resulting in severe 
restrictions on the plaintiff’s practice and an impending group boycott of his services by the 
defendants and other hospitals throughout the Los Angeles area.  The plaintiff filed a complaint 
in federal court alleging, among other things, that the defendants had conspired to drive him out 
of the Los Angeles market by boycotting his services in an effort to increase their market share.  
To establish federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
corporate parent’s hospitals served nonresident patients, received reimbursements from out-of-
state insurers and the federal government, purchased supplies from the stream of commerce, and 
distributed peer review reports across state lines.  In response to the defendants’ contention that 
the plaintiff’s complaint failed to describe an adequate nexus between the alleged group boycott 
and interstate commerce, the District Court dismissed the complaint.  The Court of Appeals 
96 McLain, 246 (Burger, C.J, quoting Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 745 (1976)).
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reversed, finding that “‘as a matter of practical economics’ the hospital’s ‘peer review process in 
general’ obviously affected interstate commerce.”97
Writing for a the majority,98 Justice Stevens’s found that the petitioner was 
unquestionably engaged in interstate commerce even though its primary activity involved the 
provision of general health care services in a local market.  Echoing the Court of Appeals, 
Stevens reasoned that, “[a]s ‘a matter of practical economics,’ the effect of such a conspiracy on 
the hospital’s ‘purchases of out-of-state medicines and supplies as well as its revenues from out-
of-state insurance companies,’ would establish the necessary interstate nexus.”99  In response to 
the petitioners’ claim that a boycott of a single surgeon was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, 
Stevens reasoned that the mere existence of an illegal agreement violates the Act regardless of its 
actual effects and that, if successful, the conspiracy would surely have reduced the supply of eye 
surgery in the Los Angeles market.  Quoting McLean, he found that the respondent “need not 
make the more particularized showing of an effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged 
conspiracy to fix commission rates, or by those other aspects of respondents’ activity that are 
alleged to be unlawful.”100  What is more, according to Stevens, “[t]he competitive significance 
of respondent’s exclusion from the market must be measured, not just by a particularized 
evaluation of his own practice, but rather, by a general evaluation of the impact of the restraint 
on other participants and potential participants in the market from which he has been 
excluded.”101
In dissenting, Justice Scalia argued that the Act’s language, “in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several states,”102 does indeed require the Court to examine the nature and 
likely effect of the restraint in each particular case.  In his view, McLain’s “infected activity” test 
was the result of the Court’s confusion over the law; the Court could easily have found 
jurisdiction in McLain given the massive conspiracy being alleged, but instead it resorted to the 
infected activities test under the mistaken belief that “focusing upon the effects of the restraint 
itself would require plaintiffs to prove their case at the jurisdictional stage.  That belief was in 
error because the prior approach had simply assumed, rather than required proof of, the success 
97
 Summit, 328.
98
 Justices Rehnquist, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurred in the opinion.
99
 Summit, 329.
100
 Summit, 331.
101
 Summit, 332.
102
 Summit, 333-34.
24
of the conspiracy.”103  As a result, Justice Scalia lamented, the Court missed an opportunity to 
clear up the confusion in the circuits following McLain and had in fact made things worse.  To 
establish Sherman Act jurisdiction in this case, he observed:
[The Court] looks neither to the effect on commerce of the restraint, nor to the 
effect on commerce of the defendants’ infected activity, but rather, it seems, to 
the effect on commerce of the activity from which the plaintiff has been excluded.  
As I understand the Court’s opinion, the test of Sherman Act jurisdiction is 
whether the entire line of commerce from which Dr. Pinhas has been excluded 
affects interstate commerce.  Since excluding him from eye surgery at Midway 
Hospital effectively excluded him from the entire Los Angeles market for eye 
surgery . . . the jurisdictional question is simply whether that market affects 
interstate commerce, which of course it does.  This analysis tells us nothing about 
the substantiality of the impact on interstate commerce generated by the particular 
conduct at issue here.
Determining the “market” for a product or service, meaning the scope of 
other products or services against which it must compete, is of course necessary 
for many purposes of antitrust analysis.  But today’s opinion does not identify a 
relevant “market” in that sense.  It declares Los Angeles to be the pertinent 
“market” only because that is the entire scope of Dr. Pinhas’ exclusion from 
practice. . . .  I cannot understand why “market” in the Court’s peculiar sense has 
any bearing upon this restraint’s impact on interstate commerce, and hence upon 
Sherman Act jurisdiction.  The Court does not even attempt to provide an 
explanation. 104
Thus, the Court took vertical and horizontal aggregation to the extreme; but-for the entire 
Los Angeles market for eye surgery, the effect on the quantum or character of interstate 
commerce would be substantial, and the plaintiff’s complaint was sufficient to establish federal 
jurisdiction.  Justice Scalia emphasized the absurdity of the Court’s but-for approach in pointedly 
observing that if “the alleged conspirators in the present case had decided to effectuate the 
ultimate exclusion of Dr. Pinhas, i.e., to have him killed, it would be absurd to think that the 
world market in eye surgery would thereby be affected.”105  The Court’s inference that 
competition in the Los Angeles market could have been affected by the exclusion of a single 
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surgeon from the Los Angeles market therefore ignores the “‘practical economics’ of the 
matter.”106
D.  The Post-Modern Era?
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Court began to limit the scope of federal commerce 
power. The ensuring line of cases raises the prospect that the Rehnquist Court has entered a 
post-modern era in which it will continue to set limits on Congress’s regulatory authority under 
the Commerce Clause.  Whether or not this is true remains to be seen, but the case law thus far 
suggests that the Court has embraced the framework of competitive federalism in this field to 
guide its decisions.
In New York v. United States (1992),107 the Court addressed the limits imposed on federal 
regulatory authority by the Tenth Amendment. There, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 
Amendments Act (1985) imposed on states the obligation to dispose of radioactive waste 
generated within their borders.  The Act provided for a system of incentives to encourage the 
states to comply with this obligation.  Among other things, the “take title” incentive required 
states that fail to provide for disposal of radioactive waste generated within the state to assume 
title and take possession of the waste and to bear any liability imposed on the generator arising 
from their failure to do so.
The State of New York and two of its counties brought suit against the United States, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the incentive system was in conflict with the Tenth 
Amendment.  The Court found that, although severable from the rest of the Act, the take title 
incentive was unconstitutionally coercive and therefore fell outside Congress’s enumerated 
powers.  In Justice O’Conner’s words:
 Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, 
standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct 
order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, 
it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the 
two. . . .  Either way, ‘the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States 
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by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,’ . 
. .  Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside Congress' 
enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty reserved 
by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal structure 
of our Government established by the Constitution.”108
In U.S. v. Lopez (1995) the Court struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act,
specifically rejecting unconstrained aggregation to establish a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.109  As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the majority, “possession of a gun in a local 
school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, 
substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.  [To hold otherwise] would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort 
retained by the states.”110 In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted the many 
inconsistencies in the substantial effects test and singled out the aggregation principle for special 
criticism.  In his view, under this principle, 
Congress can regulate whole categories of activities that are not themselves either 
“interstate” or “commerce.”  In applying the [substantial] effects test, we ask 
whether the class of activities as a whole substantially affects interstate 
commerce, not whether any specific activity within the class has such effects 
when considered in isolation. . . .  The aggregation principle is clever, but has no 
stopping point. . . .  [O]ne always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an 
activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on 
commerce. 111
In U.S. v. Morrison (2000) the Court struck down the civil remedy provision of the 
Violence Against Women Act, specifically rejecting Congress’s reliance on the aggregation 
principle to establish a substantial effect on interstate commerce.112  According to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, it is unworkable to extrapolate a “but-for causal chain from the initial occurrence of 
violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce.  If accepted, [this] 
reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated 
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impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or 
consumption.”113
Various justices in Lopez and Morrison implicitly relied on the framework of competitive 
federalism as a basis for resolving the balance of dual sovereignty.  In Lopez, Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor emphasized the importance of political innovation.  In their words:
While it is doubtful that any State, or indeed any reasonable person, would 
argue that it is wise policy to allow students to carry guns on school premises, 
considerable disagreement exists about how best to accomplish that goal.  In this 
circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are revealed, for the States 
may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to devise various 
solutions where the best solution is far from clear. . . .  If a State or municipality 
determines that harsh criminal sanctions are necessary and wise to deter students 
from carrying guns on school premises, the reserved powers of the States are 
sufficient to enact those measures.  Indeed, over 40 States already have criminal 
laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.114
More recently, in Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(2001),115 the Court struck down the Corps’ regulation of “isolated wetlands” pursuant to the 
Migratory Bird Rule (1986).  In the majority’s view, the rulemaking authority Congress granted 
to the Corps under the Clean Water Act (1972) lacked the clear expression of Congressional 
intent to encroach on the traditional state police powers necessary to support the Migratory Bird 
Rule.  Notable in this decision is Justice Stevens’s dissent, joined by three other justices, which 
makes a strong theoretical case for competitive federalism as a basis for federal regulation:
The migratory bird rule does not blur the “distinction between what is truly 
national and what is truly local.” . . .  Justice Holmes cogently observed in 
Missouri v. Holland that the protection of migratory birds is a textbook example 
of a national problem. . . .  The destruction of aquatic migratory bird habitat, like 
so many other environmental problems, is an action in which the benefits (e.g., a 
new landfill) are disproportionately local, while many of the costs (e.g., fewer 
migratory birds) are widely dispersed and often borne by citizens living in other 
States.  In such situations, described by economists as involving “externalities,” 
federal regulation is both appropriate and necessary.116
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Nothing in this statement is inconsistent the reasoning the majority used to arrive at its decision.  
It appears simply that the majority considered migratory bird populations’ use of isolated 
wetlands to be so remote from Congress’s purpose in passing the Act that the Corps’ adoption of 
the Migratory Bird Rule required a specific Congressional grant of rule making authority.
II. PRACTICAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
“If two children operating competing lemonade stands decided to fix prices, the effect on 
interstate commerce would be trivial.” .’”117
Early on in the development of Sherman Act case law the Court groped for a clear 
standard by which to evaluate trade restraints.  Candidates included the “preservation of small 
dealers and worthy men,” the maintenance of reasonable prices, the maintenance of large 
numbers of competitors, the fragmentation of markets, and the suppression of “great 
aggregations of capital.”118  The result was a confused and often pernicious body of antitrust 
precedents.  Antitrust scholars and jurists now largely agree that the exclusive goal of the 
Sherman Act and other antitrust laws is to promote “consumer welfare,” as most forcefully 
advanced by Robert Bork.119  According to the consumer welfare standard, business 
arrangements that create market power invariably generate allocative inefficiency reflected in 
reduced output and higher prices to consumers.120  But they may also generate offsetting 
117 Hammes v. Aamco, 33 F.3d 774, 780 (1994) (J. Posner).
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productive efficiency by integrating operations and lowering production costs, which tends to 
increase output and lower prices.  Consumer welfare is best served by prohibiting business 
arrangements whose probable net effect is to reduce output and raise prices; that is, to restrain 
trade.
Based on the consumer welfare standard, Bork rationalized the use of a per se rule against 
“naked” horizontal restraints of trade such as price fixing, proposed a market share test for 
horizontal mergers, and persuasively argued that all vertical restraints should be subject to a full 
evidentiary inquiry under the rule of reason.  As a result, the case law has become clearer and 
more predictable, with the adoption of an output test to distinguish per se restraints from those 
best addressed under a full reasonableness inquiry, a full reasonableness inquiry for vertical 
division of territories and vertical maximum retail prices, and a virtual presumption that 
predatory pricing is economically irrational.  Horizontal merger policy has evolved toward a 
workable set of market share tests for identifying the mergers antitrust agencies can be expected 
to challenge for the likely exercise of market power.
Part A of this section briefly describes the simple economics of market power.  Part B 
describes the practical analytical framework the antitrust agencies use to identify the extent of 
the market for assessing the effect of horizontal mergers on market power.  Part C briefly 
describes how this framework can be adapted to assess the scope of price effects for the purpose 
of establishing federal jurisdiction under the geographic market power test.
 A.  The Economics of Market Power
Consider an isolated island economy in which there are a large number consumers and 
100 wealth maximizing widget firms, all of whom face the same production technology and 
therefore operate at the same scale.121  For simplicity, assume consumers believe there are no 
close substitutes for widgets and that any transaction costs consumers would ordinarily face in 
arbitraging the price of widgets across firms are zero.  Under these circumstances, the 
“representative” firm shown in Figure 1 illustrates a competitive widget market in which no firm 
is able to exercise market power and resources are allocated efficiently.  DR reflects this firm’s 
121
 The persistence of 100 equal size firms requires diseconomies of scale for any firm that attempts to expand 
production beyond its current scale.
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pro rata share of total market demand for widgets and MC reflects its marginal cost of producing 
widgets.  DR slopes down because the value consumers place on additional widgets declines as 
their consumption rate rises.  MC slopes up because the value of the resources taken from other 
sectors of the economy to produce widgets increases as the rate of widget production rises.122
The intersection of DR and MC determines the equilibrium market price, P*, and the 
representative firm’s rate of production, Q*.
Because the marginal value consumers place on widgets is exactly equal to the marginal 
cost of widget production, this equilibrium achieves allocative efficiency in the sense that it 
maximizes the surplus value of widget production.  The representative firm collects P*Q* 
revenue from consumers and earns producer surplus equal to area DFI, while consumers earn a 
surplus equal to area DFA.123  There is no way to reallocate resources to improve one party’s 
welfare without reducing another party’s welfare by a greater amount.
It is important to understand that DR is not the demand curve perceived by the 
representative firm if it considers adjusting its rate of output unilaterally.  Rather, DR indicates its 
pro rata share of total market sales to consumers if all firms charge the same price.  If the price 
of inputs critical to the widget production process were to decline, for example, MC would shift 
down and its intersection with DR would accurately describe the resulting equilibrium for the 
representative firm.  All firms would increase their production rate and decrease price identically 
because consumers would stand ready to arbitrage any price differences between firms.  If any 
single firm unilaterally lowers price even slightly below P*, consumers would react by offering 
to shift all their purchases to it.  Since the firm can sell as many widgets as it wants at P*, 
however, it has no incentive to lower price.  Alternatively, consumers would react decisively to 
even a modest increase in price above P* by a single firm, shifting all their purchases to the 
remaining 99 firms and leaving the recalcitrant firm with zero sales.124  Thus, if any single firm 
considers adjusting price, while other firms maintain price at P*, it faces a demand curve equal to 
D* that is horizontal, or perfectly elastic, at P*.  Because the firm receives P* on every unit it 
sells, D* is coincident with its marginal revenue curve, MR*.  Recognizing it can have no 
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 We assume there are no spillovers or externalities in either consumption or production, so that DR and MC reflect 
all social costs and benefits.
123
 Producer surplus is defined as total revenue, P*Q*, minus the area under MC up to Q*, while consumer surplus is 
defined as the area under DR up to Q* minus total expenditures, P*Q*.
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influence on the market price by adjusting production, the firm takes the competitive market 
price as given and is completely devoid of market power.
It is fairly easy to see the effects of market power by hypothesizing that the island’s 
widget firms suddenly gain the ability to coordinate production, either by colluding or by 
merging into a single firm.  By coordinating, they are able to exercise market power, which is 
simply the ability to raise price above P* without experiencing a complete loss of sales.  Unlike 
the situation described above, the representative firm now perceives a demand curve equal to DR.  
Since DR is downward sloping, as the firm raises price it sells fewer widgets, but because 
consumers have imperfect substitutes for widgets they do not reduce their purchases to zero.  
Under the standard assumption that firms must charge a uniform price for all the widgets it sells, 
the representative firm’s marginal revenue is now shown by MRR.125  To maximize wealth, the 
firm reduces its rate of output to QC, where MRR intersects MC, and then charges the highest 
possible uniform price at which all QC widgets can be sold.  This occurs at PC.  The motivation 
for exercising market power is that it may increase the firm’s total surplus, now equal to total 
revenue (PCQC) minus the area under MC up to QC.  This corresponds to area BCHI.126
The problem with market power is not specifically that it allows colluding widget firms 
to earn additional profits, but that it allows them to earn additional profits by reducing output 
below Q*, which leads to allocative inefficiency.  At the lower production rate of QC, the value 
consumers place on the marginal widget increases to PC, while the cost of the marginal widget in 
terms of the value of resources forgone in production falls to MCC.  The difference is what Frank 
Easterbrook has characterized as the “monopoly overcharge.”127  Too few widgets are produced, 
too few resources are devoted to widget production, and too many resources are devoted to non-
widget sectors of the economy where they provide a smaller surplus.  Consumers would have 
valued the production that has been lost equal to the area under DR from Q* to QC, while the 
costs saved are equal only to the area under MC between these two points.  In total, the island 
economy loses consumer and producer surplus equal to area CFH, often characterized as the 
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deadweight loss due to monopoly or simply as the welfare triangle.128  Unlike the situation 
depicted above in which widget firms are unable to coordinate, resources can now be reallocated 
to improve the parties’ net welfare, and this is exactly what the Sherman Act is designed to 
achieve under the consumer welfare standard.
The exercise of market power under these circumstances is a textbook example of a 
market failure, in which the decision maker — the organization of colluding firms — is unable to 
capture the full benefit from expanding output because some of the benefit spills over to 
consumers.  This is because the private benefit to colluding firms, reflected by MRR, declines 
more rapidly as production rises than the social benefit to consumers, reflected by DR.  The 
market failure is a direct result of the requirement that the cartel charge a uniform price for all 
the widgets it sells.  Starting at any arbitrary price and production rate along DR in Figure 1, to 
increase sales under the uniform price constraint the cartel must reduce price on the additional 
widgets it wants to sell and on the widgets it would have sold absent the price reduction.  The 
price reduction on these intramarginal widgets spills over to consumers, who otherwise would 
have purchased them at the higher price.  The firm naturally fails to consider the spillover in 
determining its wealth maximizing rate of production; it produces too little because it is unable 
to realize the full value of production as revenue, hence the market failure.
Many of the trade restraints addressed by the Sherman Act arise from horizontal 
arrangements between firms that would otherwise act as rivals.  Horizontal arrangements 
involving no integration of productive activity are considered the most likely to result in the 
exercise of market power.  The most obvious example is collusive agreements between 
independent firms to restrict production and raise prices.  Horizontal division of territories or 
customer allocations between independent firms can have the same effect on production and 
prices.  These are thought to be the most serious types of horizontal trade restraints because the 
participating firms remain independent.  As a result, they are treated as unreasonable per se in 
the antitrust case law.129  Horizontal mergers between competing firms can also lead to reduced 
output and increased prices, but given that the participating firms integrate their productive 
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activities antitrust economists believe any resulting allocative inefficiency may be offset by 
productive efficiencies that allow the new firm to cut production costs and possibly prices.130
These types of restraints are evaluated with a full evidentiary inquiry into their reasonableness.
B.  Market Definition and Market Power
As Justice Scalia noted in his Summit dissent, antitrust analysis requires the definition of 
an appropriate market. The foregoing model can be used as the basis for identifying the extent of 
the market and assessing the likely affect of trade restraints on market power.  It is important to 
keep in mind that there is no theoretically “correct” market in any given setting; the broader the 
market as defined, all else being equal, the smaller the combined market share of a specific group 
of coordinating firms and the less likely their restraint is to create market power.  There are two 
dimensions to any market definition, the relevant product and the relevant geographic scope.  
Because our ultimate concern is the proper limit of Sherman Act jurisdiction — an inherently 
spatial concern — our primary focus is on the geographic scope of the market, although before 
proceeding it is necessary to briefly explain how to identify the relevant product.
In describing the widget market on our hypothetical island economy, we finessed the 
problem of defining the relevant product by assuming widgets have no close substitutes in 
consumers’ perception.  In reality, if a group of firms raises the price of their product relative to 
competing products, consumers are likely to substitute the low-priced product for the high-priced 
product, thereby limiting the firms’ ability to sustain the price increase.  Consumers’ willingness 
to substitute between alternatives in the face of a relative price change determines the extent of 
the product market.  In antitrust law, the more closely two goods compete the more likely they 
are to be considered in the same product market precisely because variations in their relative 
prices are will cause consumers to substitute between them.  
It is fairly easy to imagine that widgets compete for consumers’ favor with other products 
within a broader product category, just as aluminum ingot competes with other metals, 
cellophane competes with other flexible wrapping materials, and Brand X CD players compete 
with other audio equipment such as FM radios, cassette players, and DVD players.  Naturally, 
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the broader the product category the less likely it is to have viable substitutes and the more likely 
a price increase is to persist.  In the face of an increase in the price of Brand X CD players, 
consumers are very likely to find viable substitutes among other brands of CD players and all 
other types of audio equipment.  In the face of an increase in the price of all brands of CD 
players, however, consumers are far less likely to find viable substitutes among all other types of 
audio equipment.  How to identify suitably close substitutes in practice is a question that must 
ultimately be answered empirically.  Based on cross-elasticities between substitute product 
categories, economists can in principle identify the most narrowly defined product category for 
which a price increase is likely to persist if imposed by all sellers of that product.  This product 
category identifies the relevant product market for antitrust purposes.
To determine whether a given restraint is likely to result in the creation of market power
we must also identify the relevant geographic market.  The geographic scope of an economic
market has been defined as “that set of demanders and suppliers whose trading establishes the 
price of a good [and] ‘within which the price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance being 
made for transportation costs’.”131  A workable empirical test for this definition is “the similarity 
of price movements within the market.”132  But neither this definition, nor its empirical 
counterpart, are especially useful in an antitrust setting because they assume the events that cause 
prices to change are be beyond the discretion of market participants.   By way of example, in the 
island widget economy we hypothesized an exogenous economy-wide decline in the price of 
inputs critical to the widget production process and found that arbitrage would cause all firms to 
increase output and reduce price.  In antitrust, however, the focus is on the ability of a group of 
coordinating firms to restrict output and raise price by restraining trade to market power.  Since 
the island’s economic market had distinct limits due to its geographic isolation, a hypothetical 
cartel of all widget firms was able to do this successfully.
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What has been characterized as the “geographic antitrust market” may be either broader 
or narrower than the economic market.133  The accepted method of identifying the geographic 
antitrust market is the “hypothetical monopolist test,” which is formalized in the Merger 
Guidelines and used by the antitrust agencies to assess the probable effect of horizontal mergers 
on market power.134  According to this test, for any pair of firms proposing to merge the antitrust 
market is defined as the narrowest geographic area containing the merging firms in which all 
firms in the area, by coordinating their operating decisions, can profitably sustain a small but 
significant increase in the price of the relevant product above what would prevail absent the 
restraint.135
To show how this test works, we return to our isolated island economy.  For simplicity, 
assume the island is perfectly round and that consumers and producers are evenly distributed 
within its borders, depicted by Circle E in Figure 2.  We assume transportation costs for all firms 
on the island increase at a constant rate with distance.  We then consider a subgroup of firms that 
include the firms proposing to merge, say those within Circle A, and ask whether, by acting in 
concert they can profitably sustain a small but significant increase in the price of widgets.  If not, 
then Circle A does not represent a geographic market for antitrust purposes because no single 
firm or narrower subgroup of firms within Circle A could hope to sustain a price increase if all 
the firms in Circle A acting together are unable to do so.  The geographic antitrust market is 
broader than Circle A because outside firms must be added to the subgroup before it can hope to 
exercise market power.  Suppose we expand the subgroup to include all firms in Circle B and 
again find that these firms acting together are unable profitably to sustain a price increase.  By 
proceeding incrementally in this fashion, we can identify the narrowest geographic market in
which the associated firms are capable of exercising market power.  Suppose this coincides with 
Circle C.
The geographic antitrust market, depicted in Circle C, may be narrower than the entire 
island economy.  For this to be true the firms outside Circle C must have sufficiently limited 
productive capacity that they are unable to expand output enough to completely undermine the 
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cartel.  With the higher price set by the firms inside Circle C, outside firms will attempt to 
arbitrage the price difference by expanding their production and selling into the colluders’ 
market.  As they do so they will succeed in taking a portion of sales away from the colluders, but 
their marginal production costs eventually increase so much that they are no longer willing to 
expand.  The resulting hypothetical equilibrium is one in which prices throughout the island 
economy are higher than they would be absent the colluders’ exercise of market power, with any 
price differences reflecting transportation costs.  This condition confirms that the entire island is 
an economic market even though the antitrust market is narrower.
There is nothing in this analysis that requires us to start the hypothetical monopolist test 
with Circle A.  Quite the contrary; in the context of a real merger proposal the antitrust agencies 
begin with the narrowest geographic area that includes the merging firms, and of course they 
recognize that consumers are not uniformly distributed across space and that transportation costs 
can vary for many reasons.  If, using the hypothetical monopolist test, the agencies find that 
these firms would be unable profitably to sustain a small price increase they search for the 
narrowest geographic area that includes the next-best substitute for production at the merging 
firms’ location and ask whether all firms in this area acting together could do so.  
Once having identified the geographic antitrust market in this way, the antitrust agencies 
attempt to determine whether a merger, presumably between only two firms, is likely to generate 
market power absent the cooperation of the nonmerging firms.  Obviously, the smaller the 
merging firms’ combined share of the geographic antitrust market the less likely they are to 
possess market power given that a hypothetical monopoly of all firms is just barely able to 
sustain a profitable price increase.  The agencies account for market shares by calculating the 
share of production attributable to each firm in the market.  They then calculate the Hirfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) for the market by summing the firms’ squared market shares.  For 
example, if the market contains five firms each of which have market share of 20%, the HHI for 
the market is (.22) + (.22) + (.22) + (.22) + (.22) = .2, or 2000 by convention.  The HHI gives 
proportionately greater weight to the market shares of the larger firms reflecting the belief that a 
firm’s influence in coordinating production in the market is more than proportionate to its market 
share.  The antitrust agencies consider an HHI below 1000 to reflect an unconcentrated market.  
An HHI between 1000 and 1800 is said to be moderately concentrated, and an HHI above 1800 
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is said to be concentrated, although it is widely understood that these thresholds are imprecise 
and somewhat arbitrary indicators of market power.
The agencies starting point for analysis of a given merger is to identify the defendants’ 
geographic antitrust market, calculate the HHI, and then calculate the change in the HHI that 
would result from the proposed merger.  As already explained, the resulting calculation is 
imprecise, among other reasons because the effect of the merger on the defendants’ combined 
market share will depend critically on the extent to which the merger generates productive 
efficiencies.  A merger that generates few productive efficiencies while creating market power in 
the geographic antitrust market is likely to reduce the defendants’ combined market share over 
time, while a merger that generates substantial productive efficiencies while creating little 
market power is likely to increase the defendants combined market share over time.
For unconcentrated markets, the agencies presume little or no effect of the merger on the 
HHI.  For markets whose post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800, the agencies presume a 
merger that increases HHI by less than 100 is unlikely to create market power, while a merger 
that increase HHI by more than 100 raises significant concerns over the creation of market 
power.  For markets in which the HHI exceeds 1800 the agencies presume a merger that 
increases HHI by less than 50 is unlikely to create market power, while a merger that increase 
HHI by more than 50 raises significant concerns over the creation of market power.  Where the 
post-merger HHI exceeds 1800, the agencies presume that mergers producing an increase in the 
HHI of more than 100 points are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its 
exercise.136
It is important to understand that the antitrust agencies face a tradeoff in identifying the 
geographic antitrust market.  The wider the product and geographic market to which they apply 
the hypothetical monopolist test, the more likely it is that a hypothetical monopolist would be 
able to exercise market power in that market.  But by increasing the scope of the market in this 
way, they necessarily reduce the combined market share of the firms proposing to merger.  
Presumably, the agencies’ recognition of this tradeoff at least partly explains why they identify 
the geographic antitrust market as the narrowest market in which a hypothetical monopolist 
136
 For example, if two firms in an antitrust market of five equal-sized firms were to merge, the HHI would increase 
from 2000 to 2800.  If two firms in an antitrust market of ten equal-sized firms were to merge, the HHI would 
increase from 1000 to 1200.
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could profitably sustain an increase in price.137  In practice, the agencies use market share 
thresholds established under the Merger Guidelines as crude proxies for the creation and 
probable exercise of market power, and the exact magnitude of the thresholds can therefore be 
adjusted to reflect the choice of the narrowest market.  Federal courts are not bound by the 
Merger Guidelines,138 but nevertheless many federal courts follow their approach to product and 
geographic market definition.139  This is because the Merger Guidelines “represent mainstream 
economic thinking,” and are functionally equivalent to other tests that the courts have developed 
over the years.
C.  Adapting the Guidelines to the Issue of Jurisdiction
Rather than focusing on the geographic scope of the price increase resulting from a given 
horizontal merger, the Merger Guidelines focus solely on whether the merger is likely to 
generate market power.  To be useful in the context of a jurisdictional challenge it is therefore 
necessary to adapt the Merger Guidelines’ underlying logic to assess the geographic scope of 
price effects resulting from market power.  For example, the geographic antitrust market as 
defined according to the hypothetical monopolist test is likely to overlap one or more economic 
markets, “within which the price of a good tends to uniformity, allowance being made for 
transportation costs.”  An exercise of market power will cause a flow of goods into the 
geographic antitrust market as outside firms expand production in an attempt to arbitrage price 
differences within these overlapping economic markets.  To some extent, prices will therefore 
rise outside the geographic antitrust market, possibly spilling over to neighboring states.  Unless 
the defendants combined share of the geographic antitrust market is 100%, however, any such 
spillovers are less likely to occur.  In defining the relevant market for antitrust jurisdiction, a 
proper test should formally recognize the tradeoff between the likelihood of interstate price 
spillovers and the likelihood the defendants can effectively exercise market power within the 
geographic antitrust market as defined.
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III. THE GEOGRAPHIC MARKET POWER TEST FOR SHERMAN ACT JURISDICTION
“If two children operating competing lemonade stands decided to fix prices, the 
effect on interstate commerce would be trivial . . . . ”140
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution states that the federal courts have the power to 
adjudicate only “cases” or “controversies” “arising under” the Constitution and the “Laws of the 
United States.”141  This passage establishes an important limitation on federal court jurisdiction
that goes to the very heart of sovereignty.  If a case or controversy does not arise under the 
Constitution or a federal statute, federal courts lack jurisdiction over the subject matter.  “The 
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘springs from the nature and 
limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception’.”142
Because the federal judicial power is limited, it is well settled that parties seeking redress in 
federal court must allege the facts necessary to support subject matter jurisdiction, and the court 
is free at any time during the proceedings to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction when the necessary 
facts come to light.  In principle, the defendant has the right to rebut these allegations by 
presenting contrary evidence.143 If the party asserting federal jurisdiction, say, a civil plaintiff 
suing under Section I of the Sherman Act for treble damages, is unable to provide substantial 
competence evidence to overcome the defendants’ rebuttal, the defendants can move to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure of subject matter 
jurisdiction, which thereby will be defeated.144
139 See e.g.  Community Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F.Supp. 1146, 1153 (W.D. Ark. 1995) aff’d 139 F.3d 
1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
140 33 F.3d 774, 780 (1994) (J. Posner).
141
 United States Const. Art. III, §2, cl. 1.
142
 Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)(J. Scalia). 
143
 As Justice Burger stated in McLain:  “To establish jurisdiction a plaintiff must allege the critical relationship in 
the pleadings and if these allegations are controverted must proceed to demonstrate by submission of evidence 
beyond the pleadings either that the defendants’ activity is itself in interstate commerce or, if it is local in nature, 
that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce.” 444 U.S. 232, 243 
(1980).
144
 Prior to Summit, the lower courts were split on whether Sherman Act’s language “among the several states” was 
a 12(b)(1) [jurisdictional] issue or a 12(b)(6) [failure to state a claim] issue.  E.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New 
Orleans, Inc. 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that dismissal should be based on lack of jurisdiction, i.e. a 
12(b)(1) motion, and not a 12(b)(6) motion or failure to state a claim), overruled on other grounds, 444 U.S. 232 
(1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1171-72 (E.D.Pa.1980) (holding that 
failure to allege an effect on interstate commerce is a failure to state a claim and not a failure to allege subject matter 
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To establish Sherman Act jurisdiction under the geographic market power test, the 
plaintiff must allege the defendants engaged in a restraint of trade that generated (or if successful 
would be reasonably likely to generate) market power that caused prices to rise in more states 
than one.  More particularly, the complainant must allege that 1) the defendants supplied a 
particular product, 2) the defendants engaged in a contract, combination, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade for the sale of that product, 3) the geographic antitrust market for the 
defendant’s product was sufficiently large that a hypothetical monopolist could plausibly affect 
prices in more states than one, and 4) the defendants’ activity generated sufficient market power 
within the geographic antitrust market to restrain trade and raise prices.  As under the Merger 
Guidelines, market concentration could be expressed in terms of the HHI, and the likelihood the 
restraint, if successful, would generate market power could be based on the associated change in 
HHI from combining the defendants’ market share.
In essence, the above procedures for establishing jurisdiction under the Act require the 
party asserting jurisdiction to allege a substantive nexus between the prohibited restraint and the 
interstate spillover that provides the foundation for federal jurisdiction.  Chief Justice Burger 
rejected this approach in McClain because he thought it would require the plaint iff to establish 
its entire substantive claim at the jurisdictional stage.  Justice Scalia correctly pointed out in his 
Summit dissent that Burger was mistaken because the Court was free to assume the success of the 
conspiracy and to evaluate the jurisdictional question accordingly.  Under the geographic market 
jurisdiction, and should be dealt with as a 12(b)(6) motion).  We feel that it is a 12(b)(1) matter for three reasons.  
First, subject matter jurisdiction is concerned with the power of the court to hear the case in the first place and is 
clearly regarded as a threshold issue.  Steel Company, 88, 94.  The language “among the several states” was 
essential to establish Congress’s authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause and, therefore, the court needs to 
inquire into whether the alleged restraint could plausibly affect interstate commerce before hearing the merits of the 
claim.  Second, in practice, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) takes the pleadings of the 
plaintiff’s complaint as true, and no external inquiry is allowed into the factual allegations (otherwise it becomes a 
motion for summary judgment.  E.g. Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3rd Cir. 2002) 
(“As a general rule, the court may only consider the pleading which is attacked by an FRCP 12(b)(6) motion in 
determining its sufficiency. * * * The court is not permitted to look at matters outside the record; if such matters are 
considered, the FRCP 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is, by the express terms of FRCP 12(b), converted into a motion 
for summary judgment.”).).  Under the rules of notice pleading, the plaintiff can establish jurisdiction for the time 
being by properly pleading the facts in good faith, even if they are later controverted.  The court should be permitted 
to hear defendants’ offer of proof regarding the validity of the pleadings, just as it might if a case was brought under 
diversity jurisdiction and the parties were citizens of the same state.  Finally, dismissal on grounds of jurisdiction 
usually does not have res judicata effects, and this will allow the plaintiff to pursue his claims in state court, if 
possible. Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, (N.D. Ill. 2000); Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 
561 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1977).  Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, usually result in the plaintiff 
being given leave to amend, and the plaintiff will then allege facts, irrefutable at the pleadings stage, to establish 
jurisdiction. Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 673, (N.D. Ill. 2000).  But in principle, the 
defendants have the right to rebut the plaintiff’s factual allegations regarding jurisdiction.
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power test, a conspiracy to fix prices might be locally successful and yet the defendants’ share of 
an interstate geographic antitrust market might be so small that the conspiracy could not 
plausibly be alleged raise prices outside the state.  Alternatively, the plaintiff might prevail on 
the jurisdictional question but ultimately fail on the merits by being unable to prove the existence 
of a conspiracy.  Thus, proof of the conspiracy and its actual effects are invariably preserved for 
a trial on the merits.
The geographic market power test imposes an economically appropriate tradeoff on the 
plaintiff when alleging jurisdiction under the Act.  The narrower the market the plaintiff alleges 
the more likely a restraint by the defendants will generate market power.  The narrower the 
market, however, the less likely a hypothetical monopolist could increase prices outside the state.  
Plaintiffs will naturally want to allege the narrowest market consistent with the plausible 
allegation of interstate price spillovers because this maximizes the defendants’ measured share of 
the market, the HHI, and the resulting change in the HHI.  The defendants can respond by 
offering to prove they have such a small share of the market that any exercise of market power is 
economically implausible.  Alternatively, they can offer to prove that the geographic antitrust 
market alleged by the plaintiff is so narrow even a hypothetical monopolist would be unlikely to 
sustain a profitable price increase that substantially spilled across state lines.  On either showing, 
the defendants’ conduct would be presumptively intrastate and unless rebutted by the plaintiff 
would be sufficient to support a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
One of the attractive attributes of the geographic market power test is that it imposes a 
tradeoff on the plaintiff’s reliance on vertical aggregation without strictly preventing it, thereby 
providing the plaintiff with the flexibility to define the market according to the facts at its 
disposal and the circumstances of the particular restraint at issue.  This is because defining the 
product category broadly to include vertically-related goods or services raises the plaintiff’s 
evidentiary burden regarding the defendants’ HHI and change-in-HHI.  As in McLain, for 
example, the plaintiffs would be free to allege a relatively broad product category that includes 
complements to real estate brokerage such as financing and title insurance.  Although unlikely, it 
is economically possible that fixed minimum brokerage fees in the greater New Orleans area 
would cause such a dramatic decline in the number of real estate transactions that the price of 
financing and title insurance outside the state would substantially decline, possibly supporting a
Sherman Act claims by lenders or title insurers.  Including financing and title insurance in the 
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product definition increases the likelihood a hypothetical monopoly of the broad product 
category in the Greater New Orleans area would have substantial interstate price effects.  At the 
same time, however, by reducing the defendants’ combined market share it raises the plaintiff’s 
burden of demonstrating that their restraint could plausibly have such an effect.145  In any event, 
under the geographic market power test the likely interstate scope of price effects is a question of 
fact that Sherman Act defendants have a threshold right to resolve as a jurisdictional matter.  
The tradeoff imposed by the geographic market power test has similar implications for 
horizontal aggregation.  The plaintiff is free to allege a geographic antitrust market sufficiently 
broad that a hypothetical monopolist would be extremely likely to sustain a profitable increase in 
prices outside the state in question, but defining the market broadly raises the plaintiff’s 
jurisdictional burden elsewhere.  As in Mandeville, for example, the Court hypothesized that the 
effect on interstate commerce would be substantial if all sugar refiners in the country adopted the 
same grower contracts as the defendant.  In essence, the Court applied the hypothetical 
monopolist test to the national market and concluded that interstate sugar prices would thereby 
suffer a substantial effect.  But the Court neglected to recognize that the refiners’ share of such a 
broadly defined geographic antitrust market was absolutely trivial and beyond any plausible 
suggestion of market power.  Whereas such unconstrained aggregation may be appropriate to 
establish constitutional jurisdiction in cases such as Wickard, where Congress has made specific 
findings as to the need for federal regulation, it is inappropriate to establish jurisdiction under 
general prohibitions such as the Sherman Act that require “a particularized judicial 
determination” in light of the circumstances at hand and the underlying goal of the statute.
Note that the geographic market power test in no way recognizes formalistic distinctions.  
Applied to the facts in E.C. Knight, for example, the geographic market power test would surely 
have found that the defendants’ “manufacturing” operations caused sugar prices to rise in more 
states than one, and the Court in Standard Oil was correct in rejecting E.C. Knight.  Neither does 
the geographic market power test rely on the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects, 
although it will ordinarily give effects that are economically remote from the defendants’ 
145
 Similarly, as in Summit, the plaintiff would be free to allege that the relevant product category includes an entire 
collection of vertically-related activities associated with general hospital services and that the relevant geographic 
antitrust market is the entire Los Angeles area.  A hypothetical monopoly in such a broadly defined market well 
might cause the price of eye surgery to increase in neighboring states, but the exclusion of a single eye surgeon, or 
even a general firm policy of excluding surgeons  from the market under prescribed circumstances would be 
extremely unlikely to generate market power.  
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restraint limited weight in the jurisdictional calculus.  What is more, whether the defendants’ 
goods are in the stream of commerce is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to establish 
federal jurisdiction.  An effective restraint by firms whose sales are entirely within their home 
state may cause prices to increase outside the state even though the defendants’ goods never 
cross state lines.  Indeed, the likely effect of such a restraint would be to increase the flow of 
competitors’ goods into the state and reduce the flow, if any, of the defendants’ goods out of the 
state.  Alternatively, the defendants may sell their goods in a national market in which they have 
absolutely no hope of affecting prices, even though they have market power in their local 
intrastate market.  The sole question relevant to Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the alleged 
restraint affects prices outside any state in which the restraint operates.
A second attractive feature of the geographic market power test is that it need not be 
applied identically to all restraints.   No jurisdictional test can be expected to perform without 
error, but the geographic market power test establishes a substantively reasoned basis for 
Sherman Act jurisdiction that allows the legal system to iterate toward an articulate set of 
presumptions that minimize the weighted sum of Type I and Type II errors.146  In the context of 
antitrust, judicial measurement error is small enough that practical market share thresholds for 
HHI and changes in HHI can be established for various categories of restraints.  Below these 
thresholds the exercise of market power is economically implausible and presumptively beyond 
federal jurisdiction. Different restraints would very likely be subject to different presumptions 
regarding the thresholds necessary for the plaintiff to make out a prime facie case for federal 
jurisdiction.  In all cases determination of the appropriate threshold would properly be tempered 
by the Courts’ recognition that the category of alleged restraints may, in fact, generate productive 
efficiencies that more than offset any associated allocative inefficiencies.  Obvious horizontal 
pricing arrangements would no doubt be subject to a very low threshold, possibly approaching 
zero as is currently the case, because it is relatively unlikely such arrangements can generate 
offsetting productive efficiencies.  Vertical price fixing and horizontal nonprice restraints might 
be subject to marginally higher thresholds, and so on, because the likelihood that they can 
generate productive efficiencies is somewhat greater.  Of course, the antitrust agencies would 
146 Type I errors can be seen as situations in which the court allows jurisdiction over defendants whose activities 
later prove on the merits to have no interstate price effect.  Type II errors can be seen as situations in which the court 
denies jurisdiction to plaintiffs whose claims would prove on the merits to have a substantive interstate effect on
interstate commerce.
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face a jurisdictional constraint in assessing purely local horizontal mergers that have thus far 
been formally absent. 
IV. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM, STATUTORY INTENT, AND PRACTICAL BENEFITS
“The greatest threat to consumers’ welfare is not states, and
their competition, but a uniform national regimen that stifles the power
of exit — that is, a monopoly of lawmaking.”157
This section outlines the normative case in support of the geographic market power test.  
We show that it is consistent with the framework of competitive federalism and with the
statutory intent behind the Sherman Act.  We also show that it would resolve ongoing confusion 
in the lower federal courts and lead to more rapid evolution of substantive rules as the result of 
political competition over optimal antitrust policy.
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A.  Competitive Federalism
The theoretical foundation for competitive federalism derives from Charles Tiebout’s 
pioneering 1956 essay A Pure theory of Local Expenditures.158  Tiebout was concerned with 
analyzing the municipal supply of local public goods, such as roads, schools, and police and fire 
services.159  In the face of literature concluding that the only mechanism for the provision of 
public goods was the ballot box, Tiebout demonstrated that a quasi-market mechanism could also 
work.160  As long as consumers of local public goods have a large number of municipalities in 
which they can locate and are mobile and fully aware of the different patterns of taxation, 
expenditures, and levels of services provided by each municipality, then they can “vote with their 
feet” by exiting one municipality and relocating in a more hospitable one.  Thus, while voting 
may dictate what level of services a municipality provides, competition among municipalities 
ensures that consumers will migrate to the municipality whose services match their preferences 
for public good provision and taxation.  The normative implication is that to ensure all 
consumers receive the services they desire at the lowest cost the size and scope of government 
should be kept small to promote political competition.161
The Tiebout model has been extended to analyze the government provision of a host of 
public goods,162 including law itself.  Laws are a form of public good because once a court has 
established a given precedent one person’s reliance on it does not diminish others’ ability to do 
so.  As with the provision of other public goods, the citizenry is best served if the provision of 
law is subject to political, or inter-jurisdictional competition between local providers, at least to 
the extent that the effects of the law are confined to the jurisdiction.  While the effects of some 
laws are strictly local and the effects of other laws national, Tiebout’s vision for the provision of 
public goods can be achieved through a federal system in which the states and the federal 
158
 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure theory of Local Expenditures, 60 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
159
 Public goods are those whose consumption by one person does not diminish others’ ability to consume the good.  
Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REV. OF ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
160
 Tiebout was responding to the literature at the time that suggested that there could be no market mechanism for 
the provision of public goods, and that a political solution was the only solution.
161
 Tiebout noted that, until the 1930s, expenditures by municipalities far exceeded expenditures by the federal 
government, and even in the 1950s when he wrote the article federal expenditures net of defense spending were less 
than municipal expenditures.
162 See e.g. Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF LAW AND ECON. 23 (1983).
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government have credible legislative and judicial powers and healthy political competition 
maintains the balance of sovereignty.
The geographic market power test applies the framework of competitive federalism to the 
specific context of antitrust.  The sole concern for Sherman Act jurisdiction under this test is 
whether the defendants’ conduct in one state creates market power that spills across state lines in 
the forms of higher prices.  For those trade restraints whose price effects are confined to the 
defendants’ home state, that state’s antitrust regulators have sufficient incentive and wherewithal 
to adequately address the problem.  Political competition between states will result in optimal, 
though not necessarily uniform, antitrust policy with due regard for experimentation to address 
novel business practices tailored to local conditions.
When firms restrain trade in their home state unchallenged by home-state antitrust 
regulators and the price effects of market power spill across state lines, the citizens of 
neighboring states bear a portion of the losses.  If the restraining firms are careful to keep their 
capital out of the neighboring state, there is little that state’s antitrust regulators can do to address 
the problem.  With citizens of the home state bearing less than the full cost of the restraint, while 
— assuming the owners of the restraining firms are citizens of the home state — receiving one 
hundred percent of the benefits, the state’s antitrust regulators are unlikely to pursue antitrust 
policy with the same zeal as in the absence of a spillover.  Only in these cases is federal antitrust 
regulation warranted. 
The alternative view is that antitrust regulation is subject to such dramatic scale 
economies that unlimited federal authority is overwhelmingly efficient.  This view could apply 
either to legal administration or to the stock of legal precedents, itself.  The geographic market 
power test in no way hinders the realization of scale economies in lawmaking.  Because law is a 
public good, under the geographic market power test states can easily capture any scale 
economies attributable to federal lawmaking at no cost to the federal system simply by adopting 
federal rules to cover their purely internal activity if they so choose.  Conversely, federal courts 
are free to rely on state court decisions covering novel questions of law or fact purely internal to 
the state.  The geographic market power test in no way inhibits the inter-jurisdictional sharing of 
legal rules.  Any state that chooses to adopt novel rules is either acting foolishly, in which case it 
will suffer from competition by other states, or it is acting properly in the interest of its own 
citizens as local consumers of law.
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If the scale economies argument does not apply to lawmaking, it can only be based on 
scale economies in legal administration.  But the claim that federal regulators or courts should 
have unlimited authority over the legal administration of all trade restraints amounts to a 
rejection of any kind of federalism whatsoever.  In an area of law whose primary concern is the 
suppression of economic market power, it is anomalous to suggest that political market power 
reposed exclusively in the hands of the federal government is in the long run interest of the 
citizenry.  A monopoly of legal administration is far more alarming than a monopoly of widget 
making.163
B. Statutory Intent
According to the geographic market power test, the most important question when 
deciphering the limit of Sherman Act jurisdiction is whether the states are independently capable 
of addressing the defendants’ exercise of market power.164  This test appears consistent with the 
Founders’ intent when they included the Commerce Clause in the new Constitution and with a 
substantial body of subsequent Commerce Clause case law.  It is widely recognized that the 
Commerce Clause was necessary to prevent states from engaging in protracted trade wars that 
stifled interstate commerce and undermined national prosperity.  Trade wars are one form of 
interstate spillover in which the state erecting the trade barrier receives the benefits while 
imposing the costs on the citizens of other states.  In this setting, the dormant Commerce Clause 
was sufficient to address the most salient spillovers, but this changed with industrialization, 
giving rise to the affirmative Commerce Clause as a basis for federal regulation.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, state governments tried unsuccessfully to 
suppress the rise of business trusts and other horizontal combinations, such as the Sugar Trust, 
163
 Note that the current system does not strictly give the federal government a monopoly over antitrust enforcement 
because states are free to exercise their own limited antitrust policy.  At the very least, however, this subjects the 
citizenry to concurrent antitrust jurisdiction.  Substantial differences between the application of federal and state 
antitrust law to completely local activities risks imposing unnecessary legal uncertainty on the citizenry.  If, for 
example, a state was to permit certain horizontal pricing restraints in the face of federal per se prohibition it would 
no doubt face a preemption challenge.  Thus, the federal government currently has a virtual monopoly on antitrust 
lawmaking except for noncommercial activity under the state action doctrine. See infra, at ?
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 Note that an intermediate solution is an interstate compact subject to Congressional blessing, which would 
presumably apply where the particular circumstances facing a small handful of states resulted in a spillover only as 
between them, such that Congressional legislation aimed at the national economy would be redundant or 
counterproductive.  Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent, 67 MO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2003).
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the Cotton Oil Trust, and J.D. Rockefeller’s infamous Standard Oil Trust.  It was widely believed 
at the time that only a federal statute could effectively combat the trusts because of their ability 
to evade the reach of state regulators merely by re-incorporating in a friendly state.165  Indeed, 
Congress viewed Wabash’s proscription of discrimination against interstate commerce as a 
major impediment to the states’ ability unilaterally to control the trusts, whose goods invariably 
moved in interstate commerce.166 This is the backdrop against which the Sherman Antitrust Act 
was conceived and finally passed in 1890.  The legislative history of the bill clearly indicates that 
its proponents intended the Act to reach the outer limits of federal power over interstate 
commerce,167 although they considered that power limited to the narrow confines of dual 
federalism as most recently expressed in cases such as Wabash and Kidd.168 In the words of 
Senator Sherman, the bill’s primary sponsor, “[t]he purpose of this bill is to enable the courts of 
the United States to apply the same remedies against combinations . . . that have been applied in 
the several states to protect local interests.  If the combination is confined to a state the State 
should apply the remedy; if it is interstate and controls any production in many states, Congress 
must apply the remedy.”169
Those who criticize legislative intent as a guide to judicial decision making may be 
correct that it is impossible to discern the intent of any collective body, and that in any event the 
legislative intent behind the Sherman Act is irrelevant given the inability of members of 
Congress to foresee the dramatic changes that have taken place in the national economy and the 
scope of general federal commerce power.170  Yet even conceding all this, there is a measure of 
durability in Senator Sherman’s statement as a manifestation of statutory intent.  Whatever 
Congress may or may not have foreseen when it passed the Act, it clearly sought to resolve a 
political spillover between states that prevented them from unilaterally regulating the trusts.  For 
the purpose of identifying the proper limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction today, it is just as 
165
 Gavil, 658-60, citing Congressional Record, 689-91.
166
 Easterbrook, 41 n. 40.
167
 Bruce Little, Note:  A Case of Judicial Backsliding:  Artificial Restraints on the Commerce Power Reach of the 
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relevant to inquire into the nature and scope of this spillover as it was in 1890.  The most 
important change that has occurred in antitrust policy since 1890 is the level of understanding 
among courts and commentators about the economic effects of market power and the proper 
objective of the Act.  That the Court’s evolving economic understanding should lead it to revise 
the limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction to better account for the discernable scope of the 
underlying political spillover would seem uncontroversial.171
C.  Practical Benefits
Perhaps the most obvious general benefit of the geographic market power test is that it 
reduces the problem of concurrent antitrust enforcement.  Subjecting all U.S. firms to federal 
enforcement by both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, and to 
private civil actions, is troublesome enough without adding concurrent state enforcement.  As to 
purely local restraints, the geographic market power test takes a first step toward limiting 
concurrent enforcement.  It is worth noting that increasing globalization is fast reducing the 
relative size of the U.S. economy in world markets and subjecting U.S. firms to increasing 
competition from foreign firms.  Globalization no doubt has the effect of reducing the optimal 
scope of federal antitrust enforcement.172  In response, rent seeking federal regulators inclined 
toward regulatory excess are likely to direct increasing attention to local markets for “non-traded 
goods” such as medical care, which, by definition, are largely insulated from the competitive 
171
 Antitrust policy in the European Economic Union apparently follows the geographic market power test fairly 
closely.  That is, authority over purely local restraints is left to the host country.  Article 81 of the EU (European 
Union) Treaty (which is the EU equivalent to the U.S. Constitution) prohibits restraints of trade "which may affect 
trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
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172 It is notable that Canada, whose merger guidelines are structurally similar to those in the U.S., has much higher 
thresholds for merger approval.  Merger Enforcemen Guidelines, (Director of Investigation and Research, 
Information Bulletin No. 5, March 1991 (Supply and Services Canada, 1991)).  This is because a small open 
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may rationally wish to allow such mergers to proceed.
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effects of globalization.173  The geographic market power test constrains any such excess in the 
face of what is a natural decline in the optimal scope of federal antitrust enforcement and where 
state regulators are capable of addressing the local exercise of market power.
Note that under the current system a state can preclude federal antitrust regulators from 
attacking both the internal and external activities of firms doing business within the state by 
integrating into the activity in question.  Under the state action doctrine established in Parker v. 
Brown (1943)174 and upheld in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising (1991),175 states 
are free from federal antitrust prohibitions as long as they refrain from acting in an overtly 
commercial capacity.  To the extent the current system allows federal regulators inefficiently to 
expand their lawmaking power over otherwise private business activity that is purely internal to 
the states, as a second-best solution we would expect states to integrate into those activities at the 
margin to protect them from federal antitrust authority.176  The adoption of the geographic 
market power test would therefore lead states to divest themselves of activities better performed 
by local private firms under the state’s choice of antitrust rules.
In his Summit dissent, Justice Scalia pointed out that McLean left the lower federal courts 
in disarray over the issue of Sherman Act jurisdiction and that the Summit majority missed an 
opportunity to clear up the resulting confusion when it found in favor of federal jurisdiction.  
Since then, the lower courts have continued in disarray, with an unduly large number of suits 
aimed at purely local activities, many of which are arguably frivolous on either jurisdictional or 
substantive grounds.  In a large number of these cases, plaintiffs succeed at the jurisdictional 
stage only to fail on the merits as a result of their inability to prove a substantive restraint of 
trade among the several states.
In BCB Anesthesia Care, Ltd. v. Passavant Memorial Area Hosp. Ass’n (1994),177 the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of a Sherman Act claim 
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“nontraded goods.”  Increased competition in global markets should have less of an effect on the price and output of 
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brought by a physician against a local hospital.  Whereas the district court dismissed the case on 
jurisdictional grounds, the Seventh Circuit granted summary judgment on the merits, noting the 
large number of Sherman Act cases in which physicians sue hospitals in federal court for 
revoking their staff privileges only to suffer dismissal on the merits.178  A similar case is Brader 
v. Allegheny General Hosp. (1995),179 where the district court dismissed the physician’s 
Sherman Act claim on jurisdictional grounds.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
ruling that it was sufficient for the plaintiff simply to allege, without any evidentiary burden, that 
the defendant’s activities were in or substantially affected interstate commerce.  On remand, the 
district court granted the defendant summary judgment on the merits, and the Third Circuit 
affirmed on appeal.180  The entire adjudication took an additional four years and no doubt 
consumed considerable private and public resources.  Under the geographic market power test, 
178
 36 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1994).  E.g., Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793 (2d Cir.1994) (affirming dismissal by 
District court of antitrust action by anesthesiologist challenging exclusive contract that excluded him from working 
at hospital); Flegel v. Christian Hosp., N.E. - N.W., 4 F.3d 682 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal of antitrust action 
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Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assoc., 996 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming dismissal of antitrust action 
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the hospital greatly reduced his privileges); Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir.1991) 
(affirming dismissal of antitrust action by physician who was suspended, put on probation and then terminated); 
Bhan v. NME Hospitals, 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.1991) (affirming dismissal of antitrust action by anesthetist who 
was excluded by policy of allowing only physicians to perform anesthesia services); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare 
Authority, 921 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir.1991) (affirming antitrust action by physician who was denied radiology 
privileges); Morgan, Strand v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir.1991) (affirming dismissal of action by 
radiologists challenging exclusive contract); Nurse Midwifery v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir.1990) (affirming 
dismissal of action by midwives and obstetrician allege they were prevented from operating a maternity practice or 
offering midwifery services at hospitals); Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138 (6th Cir.1990) (affirming 
dismissal of action by radiologist challenging exclusive contract); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 800 
F.2d 119 (7th Cir.1986) (affirming dismissal of action by anesthesiologist's privileges terminated); Goss v. 
Memorial Hosp. System, 789 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.1986) (affirming dismissal of action by physician whose privileges 
terminated); Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hosp., 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.1984) (affirming dismissal of 
action by anesthesiologist challenging contract); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Med. Ctr., 684 F.2d 1346 
(7th Cir.1982) (vacating preliminary injunction which was decided in favor of anesthesiologist challenging 
exclusive contract); Cogan v. Harford Memorial Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1013 (D.Md.1994) (dismissing of action 
against hospital whose policy excluded unaccredited radiology center); Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 836 
F.Supp. 1522 (W.D.Mo.1993) (dismissing action by physician excluded after peer review); Scara v. Bradley 
Memorial Hosp., 1993 WL 404150 (E.D. Tenn.) (dismissing action by anesthesiologist challenging exclusive 
contract); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 814 F. Supp. 1254 (W.D.Pa.1992) (dismissing action by physician whose 
privileges terminated); Jackson v. Radcliffe, 795 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.Tex.1992) (dismissing action against hospital 
that terminated radiologist's contract).
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these cases would likely be dismissed at the outset on jurisdictional grounds or never filed in the 
first place. 
Consider Hamilton Chapter of Alpha Delta Phi, Inc. v. Hamilton College,181 where a 
group of fraternities sued a private college that required all students to live in college housing 
and participate in the college meal plan.  The district court dismissed the case on jurisdictional 
grounds.182  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the College’s activities 
had the necessary connection to interstate commerce because many of its students were 
nonresidents.183  On remand, the district court dismissed on the merits for lack of market power
in housing.184  Here, as in Brader, the final decision took four years from the initial dismissal on 
jurisdictional grounds but was finally decided on the basis of facts that could well have been 
used to defeat jurisdiction under the geographic market power test.185
In many Sherman Act cases following Summit, plaintiffs have declined even to raise the 
issue of jurisdiction.  Knowing the court will simply assume jurisdiction is satisfied,186 they 
proceed to a trial on the merits.  In County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Community Hosp.,187 for 
example, a family practice physician sued a local hospital, claiming the hospital’s policy of 
granting the privilege to perform caesarian sections only to certified obstetricians or physicians 
passing rigorous special training violated the Sherman Act.  The district court granted the 
hospital’s motion for summary judgment, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  
Nowhere in the decision is the issue of jurisdiction discussed, let alone adjudicated.  In Wagner 
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185 See, also, Lifeline Ltd. No. II v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 821 F.Supp. 1201 (E.D.Mich. 1993) 
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v. Magellan Health Services, Inc.,188 a psychiatrist sued a managed care organization claiming it 
had blacklisted him in violation of the Sherman Act.  The plaintiff alleged that the relevant 
geographic market was the town of Barrington, apparently in an effort to make the defendant’s 
measured market share and likely market power appear large.  The defendant in this case did not 
even bother to move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  Yet, the district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment.  According to the court, the plaintiff’s case failed on 
the merits because the market was entirely intrastate and therefore the alleged restraint was not, 
in substance, the kind prohibited by the Act.189  The lesson from these cases is that defendants 
with legitimate jurisdictional claims would rather litigate on the merits outright than press their 
jurisdictional claims and face the uncertainty and expense of an appeal on jurisdictional 
grounds.190
These and many other cases suggests that Sherman Act defendants are being deprived of 
jurisdictional protections with little corresponding benefit other than the opportunity for 
plaintiffs to extract concessions by engaging in costly discovery and then proceeding to a full 
trial on the merits.  In the physician termination cases, it is easy to imagine that hospitals have a 
legitimate stake in the conduct of their staff physicians but very difficult to imagine how a 
uniform national rule on the subject promotes consumer welfare in any way.  With even a remote 
threat of treble damages, many defendants no doubt settle what should be considered frivolous 
federal claims.  By establishing a clear and substantively reasoned basis for Sherman Act 
jurisdiction, the geographic market power test would prevent waste of judicial resources and 
restore defendants’ jurisdictional protections.  It holds out the prospect that the proper treatment
of novel business practices can be more quickly and reliably discerned by allowing states to 
innovate their own rules where the resulting effects are completely internal to the state.
A virtual scientific revolution in economics over the past 40 years has shown that 
competition leads private parties to choose the form of organization that internalizes, as far as 
possible, what would otherwise be economic market spillovers.191  By allowing political 
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189 See also Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal on 
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competition between states to resolve any remaining internal spillovers according to local 
circumstances, the geographic market power test promises to hasten the rate at which substantive 
antitrust law evolves toward the optimal treatment of novel business practices alleged to restrain 
trade.  The weight of federal antitrust case law and commentary makes abundantly that clear 
considerable disagreement exists about the nature or effect of novel business practices.  Federal 
courts have often failed to correctly assess many such practices, with a decidedly negative effect 
on consumer welfare during the interim.  Examples include the Court’s recent reversal of the per 
se rule against vertically imposed maximum prices,192 its earlier reversal of the per se rule 
against vertically imposed exclusive territories,193 and the advent of the characterization question 
to parse horizontal restraints that are unreasonable per se from those subject to a full 
reasonableness inquiry.194  Even now federal courts are struggling with the proper application of 
the Sherman Act to horizontal aggregations in so-called “network industries,” for which the 
optimal tradeoff between allocative and productive efficiency is far from clear.195  This is not to 
criticize our federal courts out of hand, it is simply to say that they have failed to preserve a 
federal system in which competitive state lawmaking could be mobilized to provide a more rapid 
information feedback mechanism as to the effect on consumer welfare of novel business 
practices.
The question antitrust regulators face in reviewing horizontal arrangements under the 
consumer welfare standard is whether the associated productive efficiencies, if any, are likely to 
offset the allocative inefficiency from the creation of market power.  Because horizontal mergers 
are likely to enhance productive efficiency by integrating productive activity, their net effect 
after accounting for allocative inefficiency may be to increase consumer welfare, and federal 
courts therefore address them under the rule of reason.196  Horizontal arrangements that involve 
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 Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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on consumer welfare.  See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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no apparent integration of productive activity are considered unlikely to generate productive 
efficiency, but, following the Court’s recognition of proper characterization, this presumption 
has changed.
Commentators now recognize that, even though horizontal restraints may generate 
market power, they may also generate offsetting productive efficiencies.  Unadulterated naked 
price fixing between rival firms with large market share is unlikely to generate productive 
efficiencies, but, ever since the Court’s decision in U.S. v. Trenton Potteries, business 
combinations seldom come so neatly packaged.  Many horizontal business arrangements 
designed to avert moral hazard, agency, or other incentive problems may appear at first glance to
have the sole effect of generating market power for the participating firms, while on closer 
examination they are found to generate offsetting productive efficiencies.  Syndicates formed by 
investment banks to market initial public offerings of corporate stock are one example,197
vertically imposed resale price maintenance may be another,198 vertically imposed exclusive 
territories between horizontally situated retailers are another,199 and copyright licensing 
arrangements yet another.200
Although courts have yet to formally adopt a full reasonableness inquiry for horizontal 
restraints, they have done so where nonprice restraints are vertically imposed.  But even for pure 
horizontal restraints, including price restraints, where the participating firms’ combined market 
share is small and increasing over time, a compelling case can be made that, absent the use of 
exclusionary practices, the arrangement generates productive efficiencies that outweigh any 
allocative inefficiency from the creation of market power.  Otherwise, the participating firms’ 
combined market shares would decline over time as rivals expand production and undercut 
prices.201  By promoting inter-jurisdictional competition over optimal antitrust policy, the 
geographic market power test foster experimentation and innovation and will more quickly 
resolve any uncertainties regarding the proper treatment of novel business practices.
aggressive competitor.  If these firm’s stock prices increase, on the other hand, the inference is that they will be the 
fortunate beneficiaries of market power created by the merging firms.
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One need not look very far to find evidence that state competition over antitrust policy 
will improve the judicial treatment of novel business practices.  Recall the Mandeville case, for 
example, where the defendant and its alleged co-conspirators sold their sugar into a national 
market in which their market share was so small they could not possibly have influenced sugar 
prices.  As beet buyers, they may have enjoyed market power in northern California that allowed 
them to impose a monopsony underpayment on beet growers.  But together with substantial 
evidence that sugar refining is subject to various incentive problems — including the difficulty 
of measuring sugar beet quality and the attendant moral hazard — the plaintiff’s willingness to 
enter into the challenged contract ex ante raises at least a modicum of doubt that the contract 
constituted a naked restraint.202  More than likely, the agreement there was designed to avoid a 
moral hazard that otherwise would have increased transaction costs.  Given that the market for 
sugar beets was entirely local, with no possibility that a monopsony underpayment could spill 
across state lines, Mandeville stands as a poster child for the geographic market power test.  By 
allowing the states to “perform their role as laboratories for experimentation . . . where the best 
solution is far from clear,”203 the geographic market power test ensures that the entire body of 
antitrust law, both state and federal, will iterate more quickly toward the optimal set of legal 
rules.
V. UNCERTAINTY, EVOLUTION, AND GENERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISDICTION
“The environment selects survivors”204
The Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison suggest a majority of the justices would 
like to establish a clear and substantively reasoned basis for limiting federal Commerce Clause 
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jurisdiction in a way that is consistent with competitive federalism.  In part, this appears to 
reflect the Court’s discomfort over its inability to bound the substantial effects test.  As Justice 
Thomas stated in his Lopez concurrence,“[i]n an appropriate case, I believe that we must further 
reconsider our ‘substantial effects’ test with an eye toward constructing a standard that reflects 
the text and history of the Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence.”205  The question is how?  The Court can begin by overturning Summit and 
adopting the geographic market power test as the basis for Sherman Act jurisdiction.  This would 
bound the substantial effects test in the antitrust context by requiring the party asserting 
jurisdiction to allege a substantial interstate spillover of market power.
In what follows, we sketch a model that shows how a common law judicial system 
evolves to reduce legal uncertainty in the face of positive administrative costs.  We then show 
that the geographic market power test represents a compelling step in the evolution of Sherman 
Act jurisdiction that promises to dramatically reduce legal uncertainty.  By adopting the 
geographic market power test for Sherman Act jurisdiction the Court can redirect the evolution 
of general Commerce Clause jurisdiction while posing little immediate threat to the existing 
stock of constitutional precedents.
Regulatory statutes inject sudden uncertainty into a common law judicial system based on 
stare decisis, which is ideally suited to incremental adjustments to changing circumstances.
Absent established precedent or clear understanding of the statute’s objective, a common law 
system begins a slow iterative process of case-by- case adjudication to resolve the uncertainty.206
The accumulated case law — including those cases establishing rules that were subsequently 
overturned or distinguished — eventually comes to embody a stock of knowledge that allows 
judges to economize on the costs of administering new cases as they arise .  This process 
gradually adapts the form of legal rules to changed circumstances, filling out the interstices of 
the common law and reducing legal uncertainty.
205
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The influence of legal uncertainty and costly administration on the expressed form of 
legal rules is evident from the evolution of Sherman Act case law.207 We have already briefly 
recounted the evolution of the consumer welfare standard.208 A similar evolutionary process has 
been at work regarding the Court’s use of the rule of reason to address specific trade restraints.209
Early on the Court established the per se rule to preclude a costly reasonableness inquiry into 
restraints such as price fixing that are so unlikely to benefit consumers they can be presumed 
unreasonable as a matter of law even though there might be rare cases in which they benefit 
consumers.210 The Court addresses the per se category of restraints in a perfunctory manner to
devote its scarce judicial resources to resolving disputes in the presumptively reasonable
category, for which the net effect on consumer welfare is a question of fact.211 The underlying 
objective of the Sherman Act must therefore be some combination of consumer welfare and 
judicial economy, rather than consumer welfare alone because unconditional pursuit of the 
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consumer welfare standard would require the Court to engage in a full reasonableness inquiry in 
all cases. Rather than being the underlying objective, consumer welfare is merely a useful proxy 
for the objective that actually drives the Court’s administration of the Act.212  The important 
general point is that the cost of legal administration affects the expressed form of the legal rule
— in this case the consumer welfare standard as limited by the per se rule213 — causing it to 
depart from an unbiased pursuit of the statute’s underlying objective.
A fitting principled statement of the Sherman Act’s objective, and indeed the objective of 
any body of common law, is to promote the commonwealth.214 The commonwealth is not simply 
the sum of individual wealth of the members of society.  Much of that wealth is private and 
beyond the judiciary’s practical sphere of influence in the garden variety of cases.  The 
commonwealth includes the shared value of society’s public goods, such as the judicial system, 
itself, together with its accumulated body of common law precedents.215  As a positive 
proposition, the judicial system promotes the commonwealth by selecting in favor of legal rules 
that increase the expected net present value of the investments private parties (including future 
generations) will make in reliance on these rules after deducting the social costs of administering 
them.216  These costs consist of the direct costs courts incur to conduct legal proceedings as well 
as the indirect costs, both of which can be seen as a type of friction, or transaction cost broadly 
conceived, that impedes the effortless functioning of the legal system.
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Indirect costs include those private parties incur gathering the information to conform
their conduct to the legal rule and, if they become litigants, to gather and present evidence 
regarding their conformity to the legal rule.  Perhaps most important for our purposes, indirect 
costs also include the forgone opportunities the judiciary incurs administering the law in various 
case categories, but also in accumulating a stock of knowledge to refine the body of legal rules to 
address new circumstances and to build in the flexibility to do so at low cost. Since legal rules 
merely proxy for the underlying objective of the law their application is inherently uncertain, and 
the resulting adjudication will inevitably generate errors as revealed by legal commentators and 
subsequent courts addressing the same or similar issues.  A cruder proxy might involve greater 
upfront uncertainty than the alternative, and yet the errors it generates may be more informative 
as to how it can be adapted to new cases, changes in related legal rules, or outside shocks such as 
social upheaval, scientific revolutions, or advancing technology.  Even if a rule is ultimately 
overturned or distinguished, any systematic pattern in the errors it generated may provide useful 
information about the nature of the rule that should replace it.  Formalistic bright-line rules such 
as E. C. Knight’s distinction between manufacturing and commerce may be relatively clear and 
easily administered for garden variety cases, but they can fail miserably to accomplish the law’s
underlying objective where their application is inappropriate or uncertain.  Because they generate 
very few nominal errors, moreover, they may end up providing little information about what rule 
should refine or replace them.  A capacity for information feedback, learning, and flexibility 
constitute long-run investments that can allow the judiciary to gradually iterate toward a clear 
and substantively reasoned body of legal rules that promote the commonwealth.217
It follows as a positive proposition that the federal judiciary administers the balance of 
dual sovereignty under the Commerce Clause as if it was attempting to promote the 
commonwealth.  Since judicial administration is costly, however, we would expect the expressed 
form of the legal rule to constitute a more or less crude proxy for the commonwealth. Compared 
to the unconstrained substantial effects test, competitive federalism offers a suitably refined 
proxy for the optimal balance of dual sovereignty in antitrust, where the geographic market 
217 See, e.g., William H. Page and Roger D. Blair, CONTROLLING THE COMPETITOR PLAINTIFF IN 
ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 91 Michigan Law Rev. 111, 113 (1992). Our federal court system generates 
information feedback in many ways.  We have already noted the role state courts can play under the geographic 
market power test in generating information feedback about strictly local restraints through application of their own 
specific antitrust laws.  This information can feed into the federal system through cases involving diversity 
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power test now allows courts to identify the interstate effects of trade restraint with relatively 
little error.
If this positive proposition is correct, then the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisdiction 
should be not inconsistent with competitive federalism’s focus on interstate economic spillovers.
Indeed, Marshall’s central economic point in Gibbons was that commercial activities occurring 
outside a state may spill over state lines in a way that warrants federal regulation.  Perhaps 
understandably, he failed to articulate any practical method of distinguishing the exact nature of 
the effects giving rise to exclusive federal jurisdiction.  In Cooley, the Court found that the 
proper regulation of certain activities demands the discretion to meet local necessities, while the 
proper regulation of other activities demands a single uniform rule.  Cooley thereby 
approximated the central principle of competitive federalism, namely that some market failures 
are inherently local in nature and best left to the local sovereign while others are national in 
nature and best left to the federal government.
Perhaps Kidd’s formalistic reliance on the distinction between commerce and 
manufacturing was a sufficient proxy for interstate economic spillovers to protect dormant 
commerce powers, but the rise of the affirmative Commerce Clause with passage of the Sherman 
Act appears to have changed that.  Justice Holmes’s decision in Swift rejecting E. C. Knight’s
formalistic distinction between commerce and manufacturing as a basis for Sherman Act 
jurisdiction — itself an unworkably crude proxy for interstate spillovers — correctly recognized 
that the economic effect of trade restraints can spill across state lines even though the 
defendants’ products remain within the state.  Note that Holmes offered little to replace Knight’s
formalistic rule except the admonition that interstate commerce is a practical conception “drawn 
from the course of business.” Shreveport provided limited guidance several years later, finding
that Congress has the power to regulate the “common instrumentalities” of interstate commerce 
such as railroad cars, even if those cars remain entirely intrastate, because restraints on intrastate 
rates can spill over to interstate rates.  Though “common instrumentalities” of interstate 
commerce is a crude proxy for interstate economic spillovers, the facts in that case suggest there 
could easily have been such a spillover.  Of course, this rule is likely to err by condemning 
activities involving common instrumentalities of interstate commerce that generate no interstate 
jurisdiction in which the federal court must apply state antitrust law, thereby providing federal judges with a basis 
for accumulating knowledge about the results of deviations from federal antitrust law.
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spillover and by failing to condemn activities that do not involve common instrumentalities but 
do generate interstate spillovers.  The same can be said for the Court’s occasional reliance on the 
“channels” of interstate commerce to support federal jurisdiction.218
Wickard gave us the aggregated substantial effects test, which, although it is generally a 
very crude proxy for interstate spillovers, was applied there in an economically plausible way.219
The Court has repeatedly used an unconstrained version of this test to support federal jurisdiction 
over various activities, including racial discrimination.  The geographic market power test is 
simply a reduced form of the unconstrained substantial effects test bounded by the requirement 
that the party asserting jurisdiction must allege a specific nexus, grounded in practical antitrust 
economics, between the defendant’s restraint and the interstate spillover of market power.  Based 
on the geographic market power test’s constrained reliance on substantial effects, we now know 
that the defendants’ activities in Mandeville, Hospital Building, Goldfarb, and Summit probably 
did not interstate economic spillovers of the kind the Sherman Act is meant to address.  These 
cases reveal systematic errors from the Court’s reliance on an excessively crude and uncertain 
proxy — the substantial effects test unconstrained by sound antitrust economics — to establish 
federal jurisdiction, and in hindsight the Court clearly erred by allowing the plaintiffs to establish 
jurisdiction.  The substantial effects test therefore has the virtue of being flexible and in no way 
logically inconsistent with competitive federalism.  Although it has generated a lot of litigation, 
it has also generated a large body of trial and appellate case law that provides useful information 
about the nature of the errors in its application and the best way to refine it as judicial 
understanding evolves. 
Finally, in Lopez and Morrison the Court rejected the unconstrained substantial effects 
test and dispelled any suggestion that federal commerce power is limitless.  These and other 
recent decisions by the Court relied on what looks like competitive federalism as the proper 
framework for resolving the balance of dual sovereignty.  Perhaps these cases signal a new 
direction for the Court’s Commerce Clause case law. Federal judges and the parties to Sherman 
Act litigation now have a clear economic methodology for identifying an interstate geographic 
218 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
219 Wickard has proven wildly unpopular with political conservatives and others who favor limited federal powers, 
but this can only be because the marketing quotas for wheat appear to have been motivated by rent seeking.  
Conditional on agricultural price supports being in the national interest — which arguably requires a real stretch of 
the imagination — the underlying economic theory is perfectly sound and based on Congress’s specific finding that 
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antitrust market and assessing the likelihood that the defendants’ alleged restraint, if successful, 
could plausibly cause prices to increase in that market. In addressing Sherman Act jurisdiction, 
the Court can now confidently reject the unconstrained substantial effects test in favor of the 
relatively clear geographic market power test.  Lower federal courts can then begin requiring the 
party asserting jurisdiction to allege a specific substantive nexus between the defendants’ 
restraint and the interstate spillover of market power, giving defendants a proper chance of 
prevailing on the threshold issue of jurisdiction.
Our earlier discussion showed that federal district courts have repeatedly granted antitrust 
defendants summary judgment on the merits for reasons that would have warranted dismissal for 
failure of subject matter jurisdiction.  In light of the geographic market power test, these 
substantive decisions now appear as errors on the issue of jurisdiction. The overlap between 
substance and jurisdiction derives from the Act’s language, which arguably makes restraints of 
trade “among the several states” both an element of the substantive offense and the basis for 
federal jurisdiction.  Justice Scalia’s recent decision in Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment (1998) reveals the source of information feedback from substance to jurisdiction.  
In his words, “[d]ismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the inadequacy of the 
federal claim is proper only when the claim is ‘so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior 
decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal 
controversy’.”220  This finding establishes an admittedly narrow basis for dismissing cases for 
weakness on the merits of the substantive federal claim, as where the mere existence of a trade 
restraint is in substantial doubt from the face of the plaintiff’s claim.221  But the window is 
presumably wide enough to support dismissal for failure of subject matter jurisdiction when the 
specific weakness at issue is the plaintiff’s inability to plausibly allege that the defendants’ 
restraint caused prices to rise in more states than one.  Because of the overlap, lower courts’ 
understanding of the nature of various trade restraints is likely to improve with accumulated 
experience. Their understanding of the geographic scope of trade restraints is also likely to 
the supply of home grown wheat for on-the-farm consumption was sufficiently elastic that it could undermine any 
attempt to support national wheat prices because it would have resulted in an interstate economic spillover.
220
 523 U.S. 83, 89.  
221
 An apt example is where the plaintiff tries to supports a Sherman Act claim for price fixing by alleging that the 
defendants raised their prices simultaneously with no additional allegations that they agreed to do so.
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improve, and any revealed errors will continue to provide a mechanism for information feedback 
and learning.222
A potential criticism of the geographic market power test is that it appears to depart from 
the Court’s repeated findings that the scope of Sherman Act jurisdiction is concurrent with the 
scope of federal Commerce Clause jurisdiction.223  This criticism misses the mark for at least two
reasons.  First, the outer limits of commerce clause jurisprudence have been shaped by situations 
in which “Congress itself has defined the specific persons and activities that affect commerce 
and therefore require federal regulation.”224 As in Wickard, Congress made specific findings 
identifying the parties subject to the agricultural marketing quotas and noting the substantiality 
of the aggregate effect of homegrown wheat on national wheat prices.  But as Scalia stated in 
Summit, “[t]he jurisdictional inquiry under general prohibitions like . . . §1 of the Sherman Act, 
turn[s] on the circumstances presented in each case and require[es] a particularized judicial 
determination.”225  In applying the Sherman Act, courts are in no position to gather facts or make 
specific findings regarding parties outside the proceeding, and horizontal aggregation under the 
substantial effects test is appropriately limited in such cases.226
The second reason why the above criticism misses the mark is that the finding on which it 
relies is dictum.  The general limits of Commerce Clause jurisdiction cannot be defined in a 
vacuum because the measure of those limits depends on the statute in question, the form of the 
economic spillover it addresses, and judicial uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of the 
spillover.  Even in the absence of uncertainty, specific activity that generates interstate economic 
spillovers in one setting may not do so in another; restraints of trade are a different animal than, 
say, racial discrimination, and the proper means of addressing them differ accordingly.  What is 
more, uncertainty over the nature and scope of economic spillovers dictates that the Court rely on 
222 Identifying the proper market power threshold for various restraints may take time.  For example, where the 
lower federal courts might initially feel comfortable denying jurisdiction where the defendants alleged to have 
engaged in horizontal division of territories have an HHI of less than 1000 in the relevant interstate geographic 
antitrust market, after sufficient experience on the merits with such cases courts might raise the HHI threshold to 
1600.
223
 United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 
U.S. 469, 495 (1940)); Summit, at 329.
224
 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197, n.12, (1974).
225
 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 197, n.12, (1974).
226 Mandeville stands as a stark example of the misuse of the aggregation principle.  There, the Court hypothesized 
that national sugar prices would be substantially affected if other beet refiners across the county, not parties to the 
litigation, engaged in the same practice as the defendant.  The hypothesis is not only ultra vires, it is very likely 
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different proxies to identify the relevant spillovers in different settings.  The level of uncertainty 
regarding trade restraints is now low enough that reliance on the geographic market power test’s 
constrained substantial effects is perfectly justified, even though the Court relies on a relatively 
unconstrained version of the substantial effects test in the area of civil rights.  
Although the unconstrained substantial effects test appears vague and overly expansive, 
when applied to the issue of Sherman Act jurisdiction it has allowed for information feedback 
and provides the flexibility to adapt to advances in judicial understanding about the nature and 
geographic scope of the underlying market failure. The general point is that the judicial system 
is capable of gradually overcoming the uncertainty regulatory statutes create and allowing the
Court to identify increasingly constrained versions of the substantial effects test.  As with the 
Sherman Act, the substantive and jurisdictional inquiries in any Commerce Clause regulation 
overlap to some extent and are necessarily economic in nature.  Over time, advances in economic 
understanding will identify the substantive nexus, if one in fact exists,227 between the activity 
addressed by any regulatory statute and an interstate economic spillover. It is the identification 
of the substantive nexus that promises to bound the substantial effects test in any given setting
and allow the Court to move toward a balance of dual sovereignty consistent with the framework 
of competitive federalism.
In our view, competitive federalism provides the ideal framework to guide the evolution
of Commerce Clause case law, but as with consumer welfare it is simply a useful proxy for 
promoting the commonwealth.  The consumer welfare standard has certainly proven to be a 
powerful expression of the Sherman Act’s underlying objective; it has dramatically reduced legal 
uncertainty regarding a wide range of trade restraints, to say nothing of its role in guiding the 
economic methodology behind the geographic market power test.  Competitive federalism is an 
equally powerful expression of the objective underlying the Commerce Clause. But just as the 
per se rule limits the Court’s application of the consumer welfare standard to economize on the 
costs of judicial administration, some version of the substantial effects test would most likely
limit the Court’s application of competitive federalism.  No proxy can be expected to perfectly 
identify its target.
wrong in the context of horizontal price agreements, where the most commonly observed pattern is for outside firms 
to undercut those engaged in a restraint.
227 It will ultimately be revealed if no such nexus exists, and the statute must be overturned as beyond federal 
commerce power.
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In applying the Sherman Act, proxies for interstate market failures such as “channels” or 
“instrumentalities” of commerce are no longer helpful in assisting the trier of fact to determine 
whether an interstate spillover is more likely than not.  They are simply too crude to be 
informative compared to the geographic market power test.  These proxies may nevertheless be 
useful expressions of the jurisdictional limits of other federal regulatory statutes, but only 
because judicial uncertainty is so great that the Court must rely on them out of practical 
necessity.  Together with the unconstrained version of the substantial effects test, they will no 
doubt generate informative errors regarding the scope of economic spillovers.  At the same time, 
litigation on the merits of a statute will generate informative errors regarding the exact nature of 
the underlying market failure.  As the case law on substance and jurisdiction evolves they should 
gradually converge, allowing the Court to identify the specific substantive nexus between the 
defendants’ conduct and the relevant interstate spillover. 
In the context of Commerce Clause regulation, many statutes are necessarily vague about 
the nature and scope of the underlying economic spillover, but it is plausible that they promote 
more or less compelling objectives, as with civil rights legislation.  In the face of legal 
uncertainty and costly judicial administration, the Court simply must provide some measure of 
deference to federal statutes in assessing whether they fall within Congress’s commerce powers.
This conclusion follows reasonably from nature of the respective sovereign powers.  In the face 
of legal uncertainty, when the national government’s enumerated powers appear to conflict with 
state governments’ residual powers the residual powers should yield because they provide the 
states with countless alternative courses of action. Indeed, this may explain the deference the 
Supremacy and Necessary and Proper Clauses seem to compel from the Court in applying 
various constitutional provisions.  What is more, we would expect to find that deference being 
wider where legal uncertainty is greater. The unconstrained substantial effects test is merely a 
reflection of this deference born of practical necessity.  It would be a grave mistake for the Court 
to reject the general principle that the activity a regulatory statute proscribes must bear a specific 
substantive nexus to an interstate economic spillover where the Court has yet to discern the exact 
contours of that nexus because it is unable to accurately measure the prohibited effects.  For the 
ideal case in which the Court’s economic understanding of the nature and geographic extent of 
the market failure is clear, as under the Sherman Act, federal jurisdiction properly requires the 
party asserting it to allege a substantive nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the interstate 
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spillover to which the regulation is directed.  Short of the ideal case, however, the Court must 
invariably rely on more or less crude proxies for interstate spillovers in parsing the contours of 
federal jurisdiction.  In this setting, the plaintiff should at least have the burden of demonstrating, 
on the merits, the existence of a substantive nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the 
accepted proxy for interstate spillovers.  Over time, the federal judiciary’s experience with the 
substantive issues under various federal statutes should allow it to accumulate a stock of 
knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the underlying market failures,228 to refine its 
proxies over time, and to gradually iterate toward the balance of dual sovereignty consistent with 
competitive federalism.
Under this approach, the charge to Congress in passing federal regulation should be to 
identify what it believes to be an economic market failure common to more states than one and 
to make a plausible case that the states, acting independently, face a political market failure 
precluding them from correcting the problem.  This would provide the Court with a substantive 
basis for assessing whether the regulation falls within Congress’s constitutional authority.  The 
Court could then review the regulation under the rational basis or strict scrutiny standards, giving 
due deference to Congress to account for legal uncertainty and its own administrative costs, and 
uphold it, strike it down, or enforce it to the extent necessary to achieve legitimate Congressional 
ends.  Of course, Congress is unlikely to be able to identify the exact economic nature of the 
market failure in any given situation, just as it was unable to do so when it passed the Sherman 
Act.  But competitive federalism provides a sufficiently broad framework that the Court could 
nevertheless make an initial assessment that political competition between states is unlikely to 
resolve the problem as Congress has identified it and then to articulate the proper limits of 
Congress’s regulatory response as it gains additional experience with the subject, quite possibly 
guided by concurrent advances in economic understanding.  Of course the Court err, but the 
important point is that it should take care to follow the general framework of competitive 
federalism so that over time the errors are self-correcting and the judicial process can select in 
favor of rules that promote the commonwealth.
We have already noted that some are skeptical that the framework of competitive 
federalism can be used to effectively limit federal commerce powers.229 It is absolutely correct 
228
 As under the Sherman Act, civil causes of action for violating federal statutes no doubt hasten the process of 
knowledge accumulation.
229
 Lund, supra at ?.
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that those engaged in rent seeking are normally clever enough to make a plausible case that the 
regulation they seek is designed to address an interstate economic spillover.  This criticism 
would be crippling if the common law was static, but both our model of judicial uncertainty and 
the Court’s recent decisions suggest that the federal judiciary is capable of learning and evolving
to reduce legal errors over time.  The response might be that this process is not fast enough, but 
the question then becomes “compared to what?”  Apparently, the next best alternative with 
respect to a provision as vague as the Commerce Clause is to admonish judges to strictly 
construe the constitution, or return to original intent, to stop legislating, or simply to do nothing, 
none of which holds out much hope for progress.  Political rent seeking no doubt occurs, but this 
is largely a red herring in our analysis because it occurs at both the federal and state levels.  
Those whose rent seeking is aimed at purely local markets, say, barbers seeking occupational 
licensing,230 should have little reason to push for federal regulation.  Instead, they will confine 
their lobbying efforts to their local or state governments.  They will organize themselves 
nationally and push for federal regulation only if state regulation would result in interstate 
economic spillovers that undermine their ability to capture rents.  Given that it can be quite 
difficult to distinguish public interest regulation from regulation motivated by rent seeking, a 
balance of dual sovereignty based on interstate economic spillovers pushes rent seeking activity 
into the proper political forum.  It is then reasonable to rely on the political process to limit rent 
seeking and to focus on maintaining effective competition between the state and federal 
governments.
The evolutionary approach we outline in this essay is by no means perfect.  It will require 
the Court to firmly imbed competitive federalism in its case law as a long-run evolutionary 
framework for redirecting Commerce Clause jurisdiction.  We believe the Court’s adoption of 
the geographic market power test for Sherman Act jurisdiction would be a powerful force in this 
regard.  Its inevitable success in resolving the limits of Sherman Act jurisdiction would 
dramatically reduce legal uncertainty in applying competitive federalism to other regulatory 
statutes.  It would also spark a sustained increase in scholarly attention to the nature and scope of 
market failures behind a host of federal statutes by those otherwise accustomed to thinking such 
projects are fruitless because federal commerce power has no limits.
230 See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
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